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Abstract
Empirical work has drawn attention to the high degree of productivity differences within
industries, and its role in resource allocation. This paper examines the allocational effi-
ciency of such markets. Productivity differences introduce two new margins of potential
inefficiency: selection of the right distribution of firms and allocation of the right quantities
across firms. We show that these considerations impact welfare and policy analysis. Mar-
ket power across firms leads to distortions in resource allocation. Demand-side elasticities
determine how resources are misallocated and when increased competition from market
expansion provides welfare gains.
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1 Introduction
Empirical work has drawn attention to the high degree of heterogeneity in firm productivity,
and the constant reallocation of resources across different firms.1 The focus on productivity
differences has provided new insights into market outcomes such as industrial productivity,
firm pricing and welfare gains from policy changes.2 When firms differ in productivity, the
distribution of resources across firms also affects the allocational efficiency of markets. In a
recent survey, Syverson (2011) notes the gap between social benefits and costs across firms has
not been adequately examined, and this limited understanding has made it difficult to implement
policies to reduce distortions (pp. 359). This paper examines allocational efficiency in markets
where firms differ in productivity. We focus on three key questions. First, does the market
allocate resources efficiently? Second, what is the nature of distortions, if any? Third, can
economic integration reduce distortions through increased competition?
Symmetric firm models explain when resource allocation is efficient by examining the trade-
off between quantity and product variety in imperfectly competitive markets.3 When firms differ
in productivity, we must also ask which types of firms should produce and which should be shut
down. Firm differences in productivity introduce two new margins of potential inefficiency:
selection of the right distribution of firms and allocation of the right quantities across firms.
For example, it could be welfare-improving to skew resources towards firms with lower costs
(to conserve resources) or towards firms with higher costs (to preserve variety). Furthermore,
differences in market power across firms lead to new trade-offs between variety and quantity.
These considerations impact optimal policy rules in a fundamental way, distinct from markets
with symmetric costs. One contribution of the paper is to understand how these considerations
affect welfare and policy analysis.
A second contribution of the paper is to show when increased competition improves welfare
and efficiency. When market allocations are inefficient, increased competition (from trade or
growth) may exacerbate distortions and lead to welfare losses (Helpman and Krugman 1985).
A second-best world offers no guarantee of welfare gains from trade. But, by creating larger,
more competitive markets, trade may reduce the distortions associated with imperfect competi-
tion and provide welfare gains (Krugman 1987). This insight is even more relevant in a hetero-
geneous cost environment because of new sources of potential inefficiency. We explain when
integration provides welfare gains by aligning private and social incentives. As a benchmark,
1Example, Bartelsman and Doms (2000); Tybout (2003); Feenstra (2006); Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott
(2007).
2Example, Pavcnik (2002); Asplund and Nocke (2006); Foster et al. (2001); Melitz and Redding (2012).
3Example, Spence (1976); Venables (1985); Mankiw and Whinston (1986); Stiglitz (1986).
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we show integration with large world markets provides a policy option to correct distortions.4
To understand efficiency in general equilibrium, we examine resource allocation in the stan-
dard setting of a monopolistically competitive industry with heterogeneous firm productivity
and free entry (e.g. Melitz 2003). We begin our analysis by considering constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) demand. In this setting, we show market allocations are efficient, despite
differences in firm productivity. This is striking, as it requires the market to induce optimal
resource allocations across aggregate variety, quantity and productivity. As in symmetric firm
models, there are two sources of potential inefficiency: the inability of firms to appropriate
the full consumer surplus and to account for business stealing from other firms. CES demand
uniquely ensures these two externalities exactly offset each other. Firm heterogeneity does not
introduce any new distortions because the magnitude of these externalities does not vary across
firms. Firms earn positive profits which seems surprising based on the logic of average cost
pricing that is designed to return producer surplus to consumers. When productivity differs,
the market requires prices above average costs to induce firms to enter and potentially take a
loss. Free entry ensures the wedge between prices and average costs exactly finances sunk
entry costs, and positive profits are efficient. Therefore, the market implements the first-best
allocation and laissez faire industrial policy is optimal.5
What induces market efficiency and how broadly does this result hold? We generalize the
demand structure to the variable elasticity of substitution form of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),
which provides a rich setting for a wide range of market outcomes (Vives 2001; Zhelobodko,
Kokovin, Parenti and Thisse 2012). When demand elasticity varies with quantity and firms vary
in productivity, markups vary within a market. This accounts for the stylized facts that firms
are rarely equally productive and markups are unlikely to be constant.6 Introducing this empiri-
cally relevant feature of variable elasticities turns out to be crucial in understanding distortions.
When elasticities vary, firms differ in market power and market allocations reflect the distortions
of imperfect competition. Nonetheless, we show the market maximizes real revenues. This is
similar to perfect competition models, but now market power implies private benefits to firms
4International integration is equivalent to an expansion in market size (e.g., Krugman 1979). As our focus is on
efficiency, we abstract from trade frictions which introduce cross-country distributional issues.
5Melitz (2003) considers both variable and fixed costs of exporting. In a separate note, we show that the open
Melitz economy is efficient, even with trade frictions. In the presence of fixed export costs, the firms a policymaker
would close down in the open economy are exactly those that would not survive in the market. However, a
policymaker would not close down firms in the absence of export costs. Thus, the rise in productivity following
trade provides welfare gains by optimally internalizing trade frictions.
6CES demand provides a useful benchmark by forcing constant markups that ensure market size plays no role
in productivity changes. However, recent studies find market size matters for firm size (Campbell and Hopen-
hayn 2005) and productivity dispersion (Syverson 2004). Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) show that
“profitability” rather than productivity is more important for firm selection, suggesting a role for richer demand
specifications. For further discussion, see Melitz and Trefler (2012).
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are perfectly aligned with social benefits only under CES demand. More generally, the appro-
priability and business stealing effects need not exactly offset each other, and firm heterogeneity
introduces a new source of potential inefficiency. When firm differ in productivity, entry of an
additional variety shifts business across the entire distribution of firms and induces distortions
relative to optimal allocations.
The pattern of distortions is determined by two elasticities: the demand elasticity, which
measures market incentives through markups, and the elasticity of utility, which measures so-
cial incentives through a firm’s contribution to welfare. We show that the way in which these
incentives differ characterizes the precise nature of misallocations. This also yields two new
insights relating productivity differences to misallocations. First, differences in market power
across firms imply misallocations are not uniform: some firms over-produce while others under-
produce within the same market. For instance, the market may favor excess entry of low produc-
tivity firms, thereby imposing an externality on high productivity firms who end up producing
too little. Second, differences in market power impact economy-wide outcomes. The distribu-
tion of markups affects ex ante profitability, and therefore the economy-wide trade-off between
aggregate quantity and variety. This is in sharp contrast to symmetric firm markets, where
markups (or demand elasticities) do not matter for misallocations, as emphasized by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) and Vives (2001). Differences in productivity underline the importance of de-
mand elasticity for allocational efficiency, and complement the message of Weyl and Fabinger
(2012) and Parenti et al. (2014) that richer demand systems enable a better understanding of
market outcomes.
As misallocations vary by firm productivity, one potential policy option that does not require
firm-level information is international integration. The idea of introducing foreign competition
to improve efficiency goes back at least to Melvin and Warne (1973). We show that market
integration always provides welfare gains when private and social incentives are aligned, which
again is characterized by the demand elasticity and the elasticity of utility. This result ties the
Helpman-Krugman characterization of gains from trade to the welfare approach of Spence-
Dixit-Stiglitz. Symmetric firm models with CES demand provide a lower bound for the welfare
gains from integration. Gains from trade under aligned preferences are higher due to selection
of the right distribution of firms and and allocation of the right quantities across firms. As a
benchmark for understanding efficiency gains, we follow the literature on imperfect competition
in large markets and examine whether integration with large global markets leads to allocative
efficiency (Vives 2001, Chapter 6). Integration with large markets will push outcomes towards
a new concept, the “CES limit”, where firms converge to charging constant markups. Unlike a
perfectly competitive limit (Hart 1985), productivity dispersion and market power persist in the
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CES limit. Yet the market is efficient and integration with large global markets is therefore a
first-best policy to eliminate the distortions of imperfect competition. However, as the limit may
require a market size which is unattainable even in fully integrated world markets, integration
may be an incomplete tool to reduce distortions.
Related Work. Our paper is related to work on firm behavior and welfare in industrial or-
ganization and international economics. As mentioned earlier, the trade-off between quantity
and variety occupies a prominent place in the study of imperfect competition. We contribute
to this literature by studying these issues in markets where productivity differences are impor-
tant. To highlight the potential scope of market imperfections, we consider variable elasticity of
substitution (VES) demand. In contemporaneous work, Zhelobodko et al. (2012)demonstrate
the richness and tractability of VES market outcomes under various assumptions such as mul-
tiple sectors and vertical differentiation.7 The focus on richer demand systems is similar to
Weyl and Fabinger (2012) who characterize several industrial organization results in terms of
pass-through rates. Unlike these papers, we examine the efficiency of market allocations, so
our findings depend on both the elasticity of utility and the demand elasticity. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first paper to show market outcomes with heterogeneous firms are
first-best under CES demand.8
The findings of our paper are also related to a tradition of work on welfare gains from trade.
Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Dixit and Norman (1988) examine when trade is beneficial
under imperfect competition. We generalize their finding and link it to model primitives of
demand elasticities, providing new results even in the symmetric firm literature. In recent influ-
ential work, Arkolakis et al. (2012a,b) show richer models of firm heterogeneity and variable
markups are needed for these microfoundations to affect welfare gains from trade. In line with
this insight, we generalize the demand structure and show that firm heterogeneity and variable
7While VES utility does not include the quadratic utility of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and the translog utility
of Feenstra (2003), Zhelobodko et al. show it captures the qualitative features of market outcomes under these
forms of non-additive utility.
8We consider this to be the proof of a folk theorem which has been “in the air.” Matsuyama (1995) and
Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2006) find the market equilibrium with symmetric firms is socially optimal only
when preferences are CES. Epifani and Gancia (2011) generalize this to multiple sectors while Eckel (2008)
examines efficiency when firms affect the price index. Within the heterogeneous firm literature, Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2008) and Feenstra and Kee (2008) discuss certain efficiency properties of the Melitz economy.
In their working paper, Atkeson and Burstein (2010) consider a first order approximation and numerical exercises
to show productivity increases are offset by reductions in variety. We provide an analytical treatment to show
the market equilibrium implements the unconstrained social optimum. Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2011)
consider the constrained social optimum. Their approach differs because the homogeneous good fixes the marginal
utility of income. Our work is closest to Feenstra and Kee who focus on the CES case. Considering 48 countries
exporting to the US in 1980-2000, they also estimate that rise in export variety accounts for an average 3.3 per cent
rise in productivity and GDP for the exporting country.
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markups matter for both welfare gains and allocational efficiency.9 As in Melitz and Redding
(2013), we find that the cost distribution matters for the magnitude of welfare gains from inte-
gration. Building on Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), de Blas and Russ (2010) also
examine the role of variable markups in welfare gains but do not consider efficiency. We follow
the direction of Tybout (2003) and Katayama, Lu and Tybout (2009) who suggest the need to
map productivity gains to welfare and optimal policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recaps the standard monopolistic competi-
tion framework with firm heterogeneity. Section 3 contrasts efficiency of CES demand with
inefficiency of VES demand and Section 4 characterizes the distortions in resource allocation.
Section 5 examines welfare gains from integration, deriving a limit result for large markets.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We adopt the VES demand structure of Dixit and Stiglitz within the heterogeneous firm frame-
work of Melitz. Monopolistic competition models with heterogeneous firms differ from earlier
models with product differentiation in two significant ways. First, costs of production are un-
known to firms before sunk costs of entry are incurred. Second, firms are asymmetric in their
costs of production, leading to firm selection based on productivity. This Section lays out the
model and recaps the implications of asymmetric costs for consumers, firms and equilibrium
outcomes.
2.1 Consumers
We explain the VES demand structure and then discuss consumer demand. The exposition for
consumer demand closely follows Zhelobodko et al. (2012) which works with a similar setting
and builds on work by Vives (2001).
An economy consists of a mass L of identical workers, each endowed with one unit of labor
and facing a wage rate w normalized to one. Workers have identical preferences for a differen-
tiated good. The differentiated good is made available as a continuum N of horizontally differ-
entiated varieties indexed by i ∈ [0,N]. Given prices pi for the varieties, every worker chooses
quantity qi for each of the varieties to maximize her utility subject to her budget constraint.
9For instance, linear VES demand and Pareto cost draws fit the gravity model, but firm heterogeneity still
matters for market efficiency. More generally, VES demand is not nested in the Arkolakis et al. models and does
not satisfy a log-linear relation between import shares and welfare gains, as illustrated in the Online Appendix.
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Preferences over differentiated goods take the general VES form:
U(q)≡
∫ N
0
u(qi)di (1)
where u(·) is thrice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave on
(0,∞), and u(0) is normalized to zero. The concavity of u ensures consumers love variety
and prefer to spread their consumption over all available varieties. Here u(qi) denotes utility
from an individual variety i. Under CES preferences, u(qi) = q
ρ
i as specified in Dixit-Stiglitz
and Krugman (1980).10
For each variety i, VES preferences induce an inverse demand p(qi) = u′(qi)/δ where δ
is the consumer’s budget multiplier. As u is strictly increasing and concave, for any fixed
price vector the consumer’s maximization problem is concave. The necessary condition which
determines the inverse demand is sufficient, and has a solution provided inada conditions on
u.11 Multiplying both sides of the inverse demand by qi and aggregating over all i, the bud-
get multiplier is δ =
∫ N
0 u
′(qi) · qidi. The consumer budget multiplier δ will act as a demand
shifter and the inverse demand will inherit the properties of the marginal utility u′(qi). In
particular, the inverse demand elasticity |d ln pi/d lnqi| equals the elasticity of marginal util-
ity µ(qi) ≡ |qiu′′(qi)/u′(qi)|, which enables us to characterize market allocations in terms of
demand primitives. Under CES preferences, the elasticity of marginal utility is constant and the
inverse demand elasticity does not respond to consumption (|d ln pi/d lnqi| = µ(qi) = 1−ρ).
When µ ′(qi)> 0, the inverse demand of a variety becomes more elastic as its consumption in-
creases. The opposite holds for µ ′(qi)< 0, where the demand for a variety becomes less elastic
as its price rises.
The inverse demand elasticity summarizes market demand, and will enable a characteriza-
tion of market outcomes. A policymaker maximizes utility, and is not concerned with market
prices. Therefore, we define the elasticity of utility ε(qi)≡ u′(qi)qi/u(qi), which will enable a
characterization of optimal allocations. The elasticity of utility can be understood as follows.
The real expenditure on variety i is u′(qi)qi and the contribution of variety i to welfare is u(qi).
Therefore, 1− ε(qi) = (u(qi)−u′(qi)qi)/u(qi) denotes the proportion of social benefits not
captured by real expenditure when introducing variety i. Under CES preferences, the elasticity
of utility is constant and 1− ε(qi) = 1−ρ . For (1− ε(qi))′ < 0, the welfare contribution of a
10The specific CES form in Melitz is U(q)≡ (∫ (qρi di)1/ρ but the normalization of the exponent 1/ρ in Equation
(1) will not play a role in allocation decisions.
11Additional assumptions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium are in a separate
note available online. Utility functions not satisfying inada conditions are permissible but may require parametric
restrictions to ensure existence.
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variety relative to expenditure is more elastic when its consumption is low. For (1−ε(qi))′ > 0,
the welfare contribution of a variety is more sensitive when more of it is consumed. We discuss
the interpretation of these elasticities in more detail.
2.1.1 Interpretation of Elasticities
Zhelobodko et al. (2012) show that the elasticity of marginal utility µ(qi) can also be interpreted
in terms of substitution across varieties. For symmetric consumption levels (qi = q), this elastic-
ity equals the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. For µ ′(q)> 0,
higher consumption per variety or fewer varieties for a given total quantity, induces a lower
elasticity of substitution between varieties. Consumers perceive varieties as being less differ-
entiated when they consume more, but this relationship does not carry over to heterogeneous
consumption levels.
For symmetric consumption levels, Vives (2001) points out that 1− ε(q) is the degree of
preference for variety as it measures the proportion of the utility gain from adding a variety,
holding quantity per firm fixed. Extrapolating to heterogeneous varieties, 1−ε(q) measures the
relative contribution of variety to total utility from adding another variety, holding the average
quantity level q and the dispersion of quantities across varieties fixed. If 1− ε(q) = 0, there
is no preference for variety, and the composition of consumption is irrelevant for welfare. If
1− ε(q) = 1, utility depends only on variety, not quantity per variety. For (1− ε(q))′ > 0,
consumers have a higher preference for variety when they consume more per variety. This
can be explained in a framework following Kuhn and Vives (1999). Utility can be re-written
to explicitly account for taste for variety, U ≡ NqV (q) for q such that ∫ qiV (qi)di = qV (q) ≡
(Q/N)V (Q/N) where Q is total quantity. Holding average quantity q fixed, adding a variety
increases utility by dU/dN = qV (q). This gain consists of a pure variety effect on welfare, hold-
ing total quantity fixed: dU/dN =QV ′(q)
(−Q/N2). Utility also rises due to an increase in total
quantity, holding variety fixed: dU/dQ = [V (Q/N)+QV ′(Q/N)/N] (dQ/dN). Since the total
quantity increase is dQ/dN = q, the output effect is given by dU/dQ=V (q)q [1+V ′(q)q/V (q)].
The two effects add up to give the total effect of adding a variety at constant quantity per
firm. The ratio of the variety effect to the total utility gain from adding a variety equals
1− ε(q) =−V ′(q)q/V (q) at the average quantity q.
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of firms which may enter the market for differentiated goods, by paying
a sunk entry cost of fe > 0. The mass of entering firms is denoted by Me. Firms are monop-
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olistically competitive and each firm produces a single unique variety. A firm faces an inverse
demand of p(qi) = u′(qi)/δ for variety i. It acts as a monopolist of its unique variety but takes
aggregate demand conditions δ as given. Upon entry, each firm receives a unit cost c≥ 0 drawn
from a distribution G with continuously differentiable pdf g. Each variety can therefore be
indexed by the unit cost c of its producer.
After entry, should a firm produce, it incurs a fixed cost of production f > 0. Profit max-
imization implies firms produce if they can earn non-negative profits net of the fixed costs of
production. A firm with cost draw c chooses its quantity q(c) to maxq(c)[p(q(c))− c]q(c)L
and q(c) > 0 if pi(c) = maxq(c)[p(q(c))− c]q(c)L− f > 0. To ensure the firm’s quantity FOC
is optimal, we assume marginal revenue is strictly decreasing in quantity and the elasticity of
marginal utility µ(q) = |qu′′(q)/u′(q)| is less than one. A firm chooses its quantity to equate
marginal revenue and marginal cost (p+ q · u′′(q)/δ = c), and concavity of the firm problem
ensures low cost firms supply higher quantities and charge lower prices.
The markup charged by a firm with cost draw c is (p(c)− c)/p(c)=−q(c)u′′(q(c))/u′(q(c)).
This shows that the elasticity of marginal utility µ(q) summarizes the markup:
µ(q(c)) = |q(c)u′′(q(c))/u′(q(c))|= (p(c)− c)/p(c).
When µ ′(q)> 0, low cost firms supply higher quantities at higher markups.
2.3 Market Equilibrium
Profits fall with unit cost c, and the cutoff cost level of firms that are indifferent between produc-
ing and exiting from the market is denoted by cd . The cutoff cost cd is fixed by the zero profit
condition, pi(cd) = 0. Firms with cost draws higher than the cutoff level earn negative profits
and do not produce. The mass of producing firms in equilibrium is therefore M = MeG(cd).
In summary, each firm faces a two stage problem: in the second stage it maximizes profits
given a known cost draw, and in the first stage it decides whether to enter given the expected
profits in the second stage. To study the Chamberlinian tradeoff between quantity and variety,
we maintain the standard free entry condition imposed in monopolistic competition models.
Specifically, ex ante average profit net of sunk entry costs must be zero,
∫ cd
0 pi(c)dG = fe. This
free entry condition along with the consumer’s budget constraint ensures that the resources used
by firms equal the total resources in the economy, L = Me
[∫ cd
0 (cq(c)L+ f )dG+ fe
]
.
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2.4 Social Optimum
To assess the efficiency of resource allocation in the market equilibrium, we now describe the
policymaker’s optimal allocation. A policymaker maximizes individual welfare U as given in
Equation (1) by choosing the mass of entrants, quantities and types of firms that produce.12 The
policymaker can choose any allocation of resources that does not exceed the total resources in
the economy. However, she faces the same entry process as for the market: a sunk entry cost
fe must be paid to get a unit cost draw from G(c). Fixed costs of production imply that the
policymaker chooses zero quantities for varieties above a cost threshold. Therefore, all optimal
allocation decisions can be summarized by quantity q(c), potential variety Me and a productivity
cutoff cd . The policymaker chooses q(c), cd and Me to
max Me
∫ cd
0
u(q(c))dG where L≥Me
{∫ cd
0
[cq(c)L+ f ]dG+ fe
}
.
Our approach for arriving at the optimal allocation is to think of optimal quantities qopt(c)
as being determined implicitly by cd and Me so that per capita welfare can be written as
U = Me
∫ cd
0
u(qopt(c))dG. (2)
Optimal quantities ensure marginal utility equals social marginal cost of a variety, u′(qopt(c)) =
λc where λ is the resource multiplier for fixed cd and Me. Note that q(c) is a function of λc
that maximizes U and depends on both the distribution of costs and aggregate entry decisions.
Fixing the optimal λ and showing sufficiency of such candidate quantity functions is handled
using variational calculus techniques in the Appendix. After solving for each qopt conditional
on cd and Me, Equation (2) can be maximized in cd and Me. Of course, substantial work is
involved in showing sufficiency, but we relegate this to the Appendix. The next two Sections
compare the market and optimal allocations in this framework.
3 Market Efficiency
Having described an economy consisting of heterogeneous, imperfectly competitive firms, we
now examine efficiency of market allocations. Outside of cases in which imperfect competition
leads to competitive outcomes with zero profits, one would expect the coexistence of positive
markups and positive profits to indicate inefficiency through loss of consumer surplus. Nonethe-
12Free entry implies zero expected profits, so the focus is on consumer welfare.
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less, this Section shows that CES demand under firm heterogeneity exhibits positive markups
and profits for surviving firms, yet it is allocationally efficient. However, this is a special case.
Private incentives are not aligned with optimal production patterns for any VES demand struc-
ture except CES. Following Dixit and Stiglitz, we start with efficiency under CES demand and
then explain market inefficiency under VES demand. We then discuss the externalities arising
in the market and the reasons for efficiency under CES demand.
3.1 Market and Optimal Allocations
Proposition 1 shows the market provides the first-best quantity, variety and productivity. The
proof of Proposition 1 differs from symmetric firm monopolistic competition results because
optimal quantity varies non-trivially with unit cost, variety and cutoff productivity. The main
finding is that laissez faire industrial policy is optimal under CES demand.
Proposition 1. Every market equilibrium of a CES economy is socially optimal.
Proposition 1 shows that the market allocation is optimal under CES demand and we now
contrast the market allocation across symmetric and heterogeneous firms. When firms are sym-
metric, resource allocation reflects average cost pricing. Firms charge positive markups which
result in lower quantities than those implied by marginal cost pricing. Even though firms do not
charge marginal costs, their market price (and hence marginal utility) is proportional to marginal
cost because markups are constant. This ensures proportionate reductions in quantity from the
level that would be observed under marginal cost pricing (Baumol and Bradford 1970). These
reduced quantity levels are efficient because the marginal utility of income adjusts to ensure
that the ratio of marginal utility to marginal cost of a variety coincides with the social value
of labor (u′(q)/c = δ/(1− µ) = λ ). Free entry equates price to average cost, and the markup
exactly finances the fixed cost of an additional variety. The market therefore induces an efficient
allocation.
With heterogeneous firms, markups continue to be constant and marginal utility is propor-
tional to marginal cost. One might infer enforcing average cost pricing across different firms
would induce an efficient allocation, as in symmetric firm models. But average cost pricing is
too low to compensate firms because it will not cover ex ante entry costs. The market ensures
prices above average costs at a level that internalizes the losses faced by exiting firms. Entry
is at optimal levels that fix p(cd), thereby fixing absolute prices to optimal levels. Post entry,
surviving firms charge prices higher than average costs (p(c) ≥ [cq(c) + f/L]/q(c)) and the
markups exactly compensate them for the possibility of paying fe to enter and then being too
unproductive to survive.
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The way in which CES preferences cause firms to optimally internalize aggregate economic
conditions can be made clear through a variety-specific explanation. The elasticity of utility
ε(q) ≡ u′(q) · q/u(q) can be used to define a “social markup” 1− ε(q). We term 1− ε(q) the
social markup because it denotes the utility from consumption of a variety net of its resource
cost. At the optimal allocation, the multiplier λ encapsulates the social value of labor and the
social surplus from a variety is u(q)−λcq. At the optimal quantity, u′(q(c)) = λc and the social
markup is
1− ε(q) =1−u′(q) ·q/u(q) =(u(q)−λcq)/u(q). (Social Markup)
For any optimal allocation, the quantity that maximizes social benefit from variety c solves
max
q
(u(q)/λ − cq)L− f = 1− ε(q
opt(c))
ε(qopt(c))
cqopt(c)L− f .
In contrast, the incentives that firms face in the market are based on the private markup µ(q) =
(p(q)− c)/p(q), and firms solve:
max
q
(p(q)q− cq)L− f = µ(q
mkt(c))
1−µ(qmkt(c))cq
mkt(c)L− f .
Since ε and µ depend only on the primitive u(q), we can examine what demand structures
would make the economy optimally select firms. Clearly, if private markups µ(q) coincide with
social markups 1−ε(q), “profits” will be the same at every unit cost. Examining CES demand,
we see precisely that µ(q) = 1−ε(q) for all q. Thus, CES demand incentivizes exactly the right
firms to produce. Since the optimal set of firms produce under CES demand, and private and
social profits are the same, market entry will also be optimal. As entry Me and the cost cutoff
cd are optimal, the competition between firms aligns the budget multiplier δ to ensure optimal
quantities.
Efficiency of the market equilibrium in our framework is tied to CES demand. To highlight
this, we consider the general class of VES demand specified in Equation (1). Direct compari-
son of FOCs for the market and optimal allocation shows constant markups are necessary for
efficiency. Therefore, within the VES class, optimality of market allocations is unique to CES
preferences.
Proposition 2. Under VES demand, a necessary condition for the market equilibrium to be
socially optimal is that u is CES.
Proof. Online Appendix.
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Under general VES demand, market allocations are not efficient and do not maximize indi-
vidual welfare. Proposition 3 shows that the market instead maximizes aggregate real revenue
(Me
∫
u′(q(c)) ·q(c)dG) generated in the economy.
Proposition 3. Under VES demand, the market maximizes aggregate real revenue.
Proposition 3 shows decentralized profit maximization coincides with centralized revenue
maximization. While firms have no individual influence over entry Me or consumers’ marginal
utility of income δ , they do have decentralized control over quantities q(c) and the decision
whether to produce at all. A shadow value of labor δˆ from a policymaker who wishes to max-
imize real revenue acts exactly like δ , since firms solve maxq L [u′ (q)/δ − c]q while the poli-
cymaker solves maxq L
[
u′ (q)− δˆc
]
q and clearly this results in the same (individual) quantity
and production decisions at δ = δˆ . Therefore decentralized profit maximization coincides with
centralized revenue maximization if the marginal utility of income and shadow value of labor
happen to coincide, conditional on equivalent entry. That δ = δˆ happens in the marketplace
comes not from firms (who take δ as exogenous), but from consumers who internalize aggre-
gate firm decisions and identify their marginal utility of income with the real value of their
labor. That entry in the market matches entry chosen by a revenue maximizing policymaker
comes from the ex ante decisions of firms which aggregates market outcomes through rational
expectations.
This result shows that the market and optimal allocations are generally not aligned under
VES demand. The market and optimal allocations are solutions to:
max Me
∫ cd
0
u′(q(c)) ·q(c)dG where L≥Me
{∫ cd
0
[cq(c)L+ f ]dG+ fe
}
Market
max Me
∫ cd
0
u(q(c))dG where L≥Me
{∫ cd
0
[cq(c)L+ f ]dG+ fe
}
Optimum
For CES demand, u(q) = qρ while u′(q)q = ρqρ implying revenue maximization is perfectly
aligned with welfare maximization. The CES result is therefore a limiting case of allocations
under VES demand. Outside of CES, quantities produced by firms are too low or too high
and in general equilibrium, this implies productivity of operating firms is also too low or too
high. Market quantity, variety and productivity reflect distortions of imperfect competition. To
understand these distortions, the next sub-section explains the externalities arising in the market
and the subsequent Section examines the nature of misallocations.
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3.2 Understanding Externalities
Although straightforward, the variety-level explanation of comparing private and social markups
obscures the externalities at play in firm decisions. The market results in revenue-maximizing
allocations that reflect externalities arising from private incentives. This sub-section discusses
market externalities and the reasons for CES efficiency when firms differ in productivity.
Under symmetric firms, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show that there are two market ex-
ternalities. First, firms cannot capture the entire surplus generated by their production, and
this lack of appropriability discourages firm entry. This is summarized by the elasticity of util-
ity which measures the proportion of utility from a variety not captured by the real revenues
(1− ε(q) = 1−u′(q)q/u(q)). Second, firms do not internalize the downward pressure imposed
by their production on prices of other firms, and this business stealing effect tends to encourage
too much entry. This externality is summarized by the inverse demand elasticity µ(q). Under
CES demand, the appropriability externality exactly counteracts the business stealing external-
ity and there is no incentive to deviate from optimal entry (Grossman and Helpman 1993).
Our setting differs from standard symmetric firm models in two respects. First, firms are
heterogeneous so the market must ensure an optimal selection of firms for production and the
optimal distribution of quantities across these firms. Second, wages are determined endoge-
nously and the marginal utility of income is not fixed by an outside good (as is typical in
symmetric firm models). We therefore generalize the efficiency analysis from Vives (2001)
to heterogeneous firms and endogenous marginal utility of income. To understand the potential
sources of inefficiency, we now examine how a decline in firm entry affects the real expenditure
needed to maintain welfare.
We are interested in the trade-off between variety N = MeG(cd) and quantities q(c), for-
mulated as a uniform scaling of quantities s(N) that maintains consumer welfare when variety
changes for a given distribution of producers. To monetize this trade-off, we define an expen-
diture function e
(
p(c,N) ,N,Umkt
)
at the market level of welfare, Umkt, and prices p(c,N)
that support a uniform scaling of quantities s(N) as above. As real incomes are δ = e, this
necessitates
p(c,N) = u′ (s(N)q(c))/δ (N)
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and consequently at market prices (where s(N) = 1), the change in real expenditure is
d lne/d lnN = 1+d ln
∫ cd
0
u′ (s(N)q(c))s(N)q(c)dG(c)/d lnN.
= 1+ s′ (N)N
∫ cd
0
u′ (q(c))q(c) [1−µ (q(c))]dG(c)/(δ/N)
which consists of the direct effect of entry on expenditure through a change in variety and
the indirect effects through quantity and price per firm. In particular, s′ (N) = −1/Nε where
ε¯ ≡ ∫ cd0 u′ (q)qdG/∫ cd0 u(q)dG.13
Letting µ˜ ≡ ∫ cd0 u′ (q)qµ (q)dG/∫ cd0 u′ (q)qdG, the change in real expenditure is therefore
d lne/d lnN = [1− ε− µ˜]/ε.
When firm are symmetric, d lne/d lnN = [1− ε−µ]/ε for ε and µ evaluated at the market
quantity. This highlights two externalities arising in the market. First, firms are unable to
appropriate the full consumer surplus through revenues as measured by (1− ε). Lower entry
requires higher real expenditure to maintain welfare because consumers have a taste for variety.
Second, firms do not account for the effect of their sales on the demand for other firms’ products.
This business stealing externality is measured by µ . Lower entry reduces business stealing and
requires less real expenditure to maintain welfare. Under symmetric firms and CES demand,
the market allocation is efficient because the appropriability externality balances the business
stealing externality (1− ε−µ = 0), leading to optimal entry and production.
When firms differ in productivity, the change in real expenditure needed to maintain welfare
upon entry is
d lne
d lnN
=
1
ε
 −(1− ε¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Appropriability
+ µ¯︸︷︷︸
Business Stealing
+
∫ cd
0
(µ(q)− µ¯) u
′(q)q∫
u′(q)qdG
dG︸ ︷︷ ︸
Business Shifting
 .
for µ¯ ≡ ∫ cd0 u(q)µ (q)dG/∫ cd0 u(q)dG. As earlier, the first and second terms measure the ap-
propriability externality and the business stealing externality. With heterogeneous firms, these
two externalities are represented by the average across all varieties. The third term represents
the business shifting effect of entry. It consists of the revenue-weighted average of the deviation
in business stealing across firms (µ − µ¯) and summarizes whose business suffers upon entry.
13This is because the change in welfare (0 = 1 + d ln
∫ cd
0 u(s(N)q(c))dG(c)/d lnN) gives 0 = 1 +
s′ (N)N
∫ cd
0 u
′ (q(c))q(c)dG(c)/
∫ cd
0 u(q(c))dG(c).
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Under CES demand or symmetric firms, all firms charge the same markup and business shifting
does not arise. More generally, business shifting arises when firms differ in productivity. This
leads us to an examination of the distribution of misallocations induced by the market.
4 Market Distortions and Variable Elasticities
Having identified externalities, we characterize how the market allocates resources relative to
the social optimum. In their symmetric firm setting, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) examine when
the market under-produces and over-produces. They find that the bias in market allocation is
determined by how the elasticity of utility varies with quantity (1−ε(q))′. When firms differ in
productivity, we show that the variation in the inverse demand elasticity µ ′(q) also matters for
the bias in market allocations.
We start with a discussion of markup and quantity patterns and then discuss how these de-
mand patterns determine misallocations in symmetric firm models. Under firm heterogeneity,
different demand patterns induce different misallocations. We first summarize the misalloca-
tions by demand patterns and then discuss empirical evidence for different demand elasticities.
Finally, we consider extensions of the basic framework to understand the robustness of the
misallocations.
4.1 Markup and Quantity Patterns
We will show that the relationship between markups and quantity characterizes distortions. It
is therefore useful to define preferences by the signs of µ ′(q) and (1−ε(q))′. When µ ′(q)> 0,
private markups are positively correlated with quantity. This is the case studied by Krugman
(1979): firms are able to charge higher markups when they sell higher quantities. Our regularity
conditions guarantee low cost firms produce higher quantities (Section 3.1), so low cost firms
have both high q and high markups. When µ ′(q) < 0, small “boutique” firms charge higher
markups. Similarly, the sign of (1− ε(q))′ determines how social markups vary with quantity.
For CES demand, private and social markups are constant (µ ′ = 0, (1− ε)′ = 0).
To bring out the distinction in distortions for different markup patterns, Definition 1 be-
low characterizes preferences as aligned when private and social markups move in the same
direction and misaligned when they move in different directions.
Definition 1. Private and social incentives are aligned when µ ′ and (1− ε)′ have the same sign.
Conversely, incentives are misaligned when µ ′ and (1− ε)′ have different signs.
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To fix ideas, Table 1 summarizes µ ′ and (1− ε)′ for commonly used utility functions.
Among the forms of u(q) considered are expo-power,14 HARA and generalized CES (proposed
by Dixit and Stiglitz).15
Table 1: Private and Social Markups for Common Utility Forms
(1− ε)′ < 0 (1− ε)′ > 0
µ
′ >
0 Generalized CES (α > 0): (q+α)ρ CARA, Quadratic
HARA (α > 0): (q/(1−ρ)+α)
ρ−αρ
ρ/(1−ρ)
Expo-power (α > 0): 1−exp(−αq
1−ρ)
α
µ
′ <
0 HARA (α < 0): (q/(1−ρ)+α)
ρ−αρ
ρ/(1−ρ) Generalized CES (α < 0): (q+α)
ρ
Expo-power (α < 0): 1−exp(−αq
1−ρ)
α
4.2 Misallocations under Symmetric Firms
Dixit and Stiglitz examine how the market allocation deviates from the optimal allocation. They
find that the elasticity of utility determines the bias in production and entry. We state their result
below and discuss how productivity differences affect distortions subsequently.
Proposition 4. Under symmetric firms, the pattern of misallocation is as follows:
1. If (1− ε)′ < 0, market quantities are too high and market entry is too low.
2. If (1− ε)′ > 0, market quantities are too low and market entry is too high.
Proof. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Variation in the elasticity of utility summarizes the difference between the lack of appro-
priability and business stealing because ε ′q/ε = 1− ε − µ . When (1− ε)′ > 0, the business
stealing externality outweighs the appropriability externality. Firms ignore the negative effect
of entry on prices and the market provides too much variety. When (1− ε)′ < 0, the business
stealing externality is smaller and the market provides too little variety. Under symmetric firms,
the business shifting effect is irrelevant and the variation in firm markups µ ′(q) does not affect
the bias in market allocations.
The symmetric firm case simplifies the analysis of misallocations as the tradeoff is between
two decisions: quantity and entry. In contrast, determining misallocations across heterogeneous
14The expo-power utility was proposed by Saha (1993) and recently used by Holt and Laury (2002) and Post,
Van den Assem, Baltussen and Thaler (2008) to model risk aversion empirically.
15The parameter restrictions are ρ ∈ (0,1), α > q/(ρ−1) for HARA and α >−q for Generalized CES.
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firms is less obvious because quantities vary by firm productivity, and this variation depends on
entry and selection. Further, the business shifting effect depends on the distribution of markups
and can have different signs depending on the variation in private and social markups. The next
sub-section explains these misallocations for heterogeneous firms. Examining misallocations
across the entire distribution of firms reveals two substantive results. First, as we might expect,
the misallocation of resources across firms differs by productivity. An interesting finding is that
this heterogeneity in misallocation can be severe enough that some firms over-produce while
others under-produce. For example, as we will show below, when µ ′ > 0 and (1− ε)′ > 0,
excess production by small firms imposes an externality on large firms. Large firms produce
below their optimal scale and too many small firms enter the market. In this case, the market
diverts resources away from large firms towards small firms. Second, accounting for firm het-
erogeneity shows that both the elasticity of utility and the inverse demand elasticity determine
resource misallocations. When firms are symmetric, only the elasticity of utility determines
misallocations and the inverse demand elasticity does not matter (Proposition 4). The presence
of firm heterogeneity fundamentally changes the qualitative analysis. When markups vary, firms
with different productivity levels charge different markups. This creates a new externality and
affects the quantity and entry decisions. Therefore, firm heterogeneity and variable markups
alter the standard policy rules for correcting misallocation of resources.
4.3 Quantity, Productivity and Entry Distortions
We now characterize the misallocations by demand characteristics. The distortions in quantity,
productivity and entry are discussed in turn. The sign of the bias in market outcomes depends
on both µ ′ and (1− ε)′.
4.3.1 Quantity Bias
Quantity distortions across firms depend on whether private and social incentives are aligned or
misaligned. We show that when private and social incentives are misaligned, market quantities
qmkt(c) are uniformly too high or low relative to optimal quantities qopt(c). In contrast, when
private and social markups are aligned, whether firms over-produce or under-produce depends
on their productivity.
The relationship between market and optimal quantities is fixed by FOCs for revenue maxi-
mization and welfare maximization. The market chooses [1−µ(qmkt)]u′(qmkt) = δc, while the
optimal quantity is given by u′(qopt) = λc. Therefore, the relationship of market and optimal
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quantities is
Firm MB
Social MB
=
[
1−µ (qmkt)] ·u′ (qmkt)
u′ (qopt)
=
δc
λc
=
Firm MC
Social MC
.
The ratio of real revenue to welfare δ/λ depends on entry, productivity and the distribution
of quantities. It summarizes the industry-wide distortions through the lack of appropriability
and business stealing across all varieties. The variety-specific externality arises from business
shifting which is captured by µ(qmkt(c)).
When incentives are misaligned, market and optimal quantities are too high or too low
across all varieties and the direction of this bias is similar to the symmetric firm case. In par-
ticular, when (1− ε)′ < 0 < µ ′, the market over-rewards firms producing higher quantities and
all firms over-produce qmkt(c) > qopt(c). When (1− ε)′ > 0 > µ ′, market production is too
low (qmkt(c) < qopt(c)). Therefore, firms are either over-rewarded for producing q or under-
rewarded, and quantities are distorted in the same direction for all firms.
When incentives are aligned, the gap between the market and social cost of resources (δ
and λ ) is small enough that quantities are not uniformly distorted across all firms. The business
shifting effect can dominate the average appropriability and business stealing effects, leading
to differences in production bias across firms. Quantities are equal for some c∗ where 1−
µ
(
qmkt(c∗)
)
= δ/λ . For all other varieties, quantities are still distorted. When µ ′,(1− ε)′ > 0,
market production is biased towards high cost firms (qmkt < qopt for low c and qmkt > qopt for
high c). The market shifts business away from low cost firms and over-rewards high cost firms.
When µ ′,(1− ε)′ < 0, the bias is reversed and low cost firms over-produce. Therefore, when
private and social markups are aligned, whether the market under or over produces depends on
a firm’s costs. Proposition 5 summarizes the bias in market quantities.
Proposition 5. When preferences are misaligned, qmkt(c) and qopt(c) never cross:
1. If (1− ε)′ < 0 < µ ′, market quantities are too high: qmkt(c)> qopt(c).
2. If (1− ε)′ > 0 > µ ′, market quantities are too low: qmkt(c)< qopt(c).
In contrast, when preferences are aligned and infq ε (q)> 0, qmkt(c) and qopt(c) have a unique
crossing c∗ (perhaps beyond market and optimal cost cutoffs).
3. If (1− ε)′ > 0 and µ ′ > 0 , qmkt(c)< qopt(c) for c < c∗ and qmkt(c)> qopt(c) for c > c∗.
4. If (1− ε)′ < 0 and µ ′ < 0, qmkt(c)> qopt(c) for c < c∗ and qmkt(c)< qopt(c) for c > c∗.
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4.3.2 Productivity Bias
The distortion in firm selection is determined by the relation between the elasticity of utility
and quantity. Proposition 6 shows that market productivity is either too low or high, depending
on whether social markups are increasing or decreasing. We use this result now to depict the
pattern of misallocation graphically, and discuss the result further below.
Proposition 6. Market productivity is too low or high, as follows:
1. If (1− ε)′ > 0, market productivity is too low: cmktd > coptd .
2. If (1− ε)′ < 0, market productivity is too high: cmktd < coptd .
Propositions 5 and 6 show the market misallocates resources across firms, and variable de-
mand elasticities characterize the pattern of these misallocations. Figure 1 illustrates the bias in
firm-level production for aligned and misaligned preferences when private markups increase in
quantity. For ease of reference, Table 2 summarizes the misallocations by demand characteris-
tics.16 A discussion of the externalities at play in the results follow in the next sub-section.
Figure 1: Bias in Firm Production by Preferences
(a) Misaligned: µ ′ > 0 > (1− ε)′ (b) Aligned: µ ′ > 0 and (1− ε)′ > 0
16Table 2 characterizes the qualitative role of demand elasticities in misallocations. Using a quantitative measure
of distortions reiterates their importance. The loss from misallocations can be summarized by the difference
between social and market “profits”, evaluated at optimal allocations. This measure consists of the difference
between average social markup and average private markup (1− ε¯ − µ¯), and the covariance between social and
private markups Cov(1− ε,µ). The covariance component shows that the distribution of markups matters for
quantifying distortions, except when firms are symmetric or markups are constant (leading to zero covariance).
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Table 2: Distortions by Demand Characteristics
(1− ε)′ < 0 (1− ε)′ > 0
µ
′ >
0
Quantities Too High: Quantities High-Cost Skewed:
qmkt(c)> qopt(c) qmkt(c)< qopt(c) for c < c∗
qmkt(c)> qopt(c) for c > c∗
Productivity Too High: cmktd < c
opt
d Productivity Too Low: c
mkt
d > c
opt
d
µ
′ <
0
Quantities Low-Cost Skewed: Quantities Too Low:
qmkt(c)> qopt(c) for c < c∗ qmkt(c)< qopt(c)
qmkt(c)< qopt(c) for c > c∗
Productivity Too High: cmktd < c
opt
d Productivity Too Low: c
mkt
d > c
opt
d
4.3.3 Understanding Externalities and Productivity
While Proposition 6 follows from a general equilibrium analysis, the decision to introduce
a marginal variety can be intuitively explained as follows. Under increasing social markups
(1− ε)′ > 0, the lack of appropriability of a marginal variety is lower than its business stealing
effect. This encourages production of the marginal variety and the cost cutoff in the market is
too high. Although the marginal variety steals business and shifts business across varieties, its
impact is small and the bias in the cost cutoff is determined by the elasticity of utility. We now
illustrate this reasoning in a similar fashion as for entry in Section 3.1.
We are interested in the trade-off between productivity cd and quantities q(c) for a uniform
scaling of quantities that maintains consumer welfare when cd changes, holding Me fixed. At
market prices, evaluating the change in real expenditure to maintain consumer welfare upon a
rise in the cost cutoff yields
d lne/d lncd = d ln
∫ cd
0
u′ (s(N)q(c))s(N)q(c)dG(c)/d lncd
= cdg(cd)
[
Mes′ (N) [1− µ˜]+u(q(cd))ε(q(cd))
]
/ε¯
∫ cd
0
u(q(c))dG(c).
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Defining xd ≡ x(q(cd)), the change in real expenditure is17
d lne
d lncd
=
udcdg(cd)
ε¯
∫
u(q)dG
 −(1− εd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Appropriability
+ µd︸︷︷︸
Business Stealing
+
∫
(µ(q)−µd) u
′(q)q∫
u′(q)qdG
dG︸ ︷︷ ︸
Business Shifting

As earlier, the change in real expenditure highlights the lack of appropriability, business stealing
and business shifting. The marginal firm is unable to appropriate the full surplus it generates,
and this appropriability externality is measured by (1− ε(q(cd)). The marginal variety steals
business from other firms (µ(q(cd))) and shifts business across them (µ(q)−µ(q(cd))). Under
CES demand, the business stealing externality exactly outweighs the appropriability externality,
and there is no business shifting. More generally, the externalities differ and their net effect on
the change in real expenditure can be signed. The change in real expenditure needed to maintain
welfare upon a rise in the cost cutoff is
d lne/d lncd =
(
udcdg(cd)/
∫
udG
)
[−(1− ε˜− µ˜)+(εd− ε˜)]/ε¯.
The sign of the first term in square brackets is the sign of (1− ε)′. The second term also takes
the sign of (1−ε)′ because the marginal firm makes the lowest quantity. Although the marginal
firm shifts business, this impact is smaller and the change in real expenditure needed to maintain
welfare is determined by the elasticity of utility.
This analysis also highlights that a comparison of the mass of entrants in the market and the
optimum is generally hard to make. The change in real income needed to maintain welfare upon
a fall in entry is d lne/d lnN = −(1− ε¯ − µ¯)+ ∫ (µ(q(c))− µ¯) u′(q(c)))q(c)∫ u′(q(c)))q(c)dGdG. Unlike the
business shifting effect of the marginal variety, business shifting from entry need not be domi-
nated by the net effect from the appropriability externality and the business stealing externality.
The first term in d lne/d lnN summarizes the tradeoff between the appropriability externality
and the business stealing effect and takes the sign of (1− ε)′. The second term summarizes the
business shifting effect and depends on the sign of µ ′. Consider the case with aligned prefer-
ences and increasing markups. Then the first term is positive and the second term is negative.
The business shifting effect dampens the other two externalities and lower real expenditure is
needed to maintain welfare upon a fall in entry.18 As the externalities move in opposite direc-
17At the market allocation, Mes′ (N) = −u(q(cd))/ε
∫ cd
0 u(q(c))dG(c) because the change in welfare is 0 =
1+ s′ (N)N
∫ cd
0 u
′ (q(c))q(c)dG(c)/
∫ cd
0 u(q(c))dG(c) .
18This is consistent with early insights from Vickers (1995) and Vives (2001) arguing that an increase in entry
hurts high productivity firms more than low productivity firms, and cost asymmetries lead to an improvement in
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tions, the bias in potential entry Me and available variety MeG(cd) cannot be determined without
further information on demand and cost parameters. The net effect of the three externalities and
hence the bias in potential entry depends on the relative magnitudes of demand and cost param-
eters including the cost distribution G(c).19 While firm heterogeneity makes entry distortions
dependent on the cost distribution, the bias in quantity and productivity can be unambiguously
inferred from the demand-side elasticities. In the remainder of this Section, we first examine the
robustness of these findings under alternative modeling assumptions and then discuss empirical
work on estimating the demand-side elasticities.
4.4 Extensions of the Basic Framework
As many different fields of economics (such as macroeconomics and urban economics) use
monopolistically competitive models, we extend our basic framework to different modelling
assumptions used in these fields to discuss the robustness of CES efficiency and misallocations
under VES demand. Details are in an online Appendix and a summary of four key extensions
is provided here.
First, suppose the costs of production of a firm vary with its scale of production. To account
for non-constant marginal costs, let the variable cost of production be ω(q) · cq and assume
2ω ′+ω ′′q > 0 for all feasible quantities to ensure strict concavity of the firm problem. The
market maximizes aggregate revenue under non-constant marginal costs. As firms account for
the interdependence between their unit costs and quantity, CES demand ensures the same trade-
off between different externalities and leads to efficient allocations (as shown in an online Ap-
pendix). Under VES demand, the bias in quantity and productivity are the same as Propositions
5 and 6.
Second, let firms choose their advertising technology as in Arkolakis (2010). A firm can
reach a fraction n(c) of consumers by spending
[
1− (1−n(c))1−θ ]Lϑ f/(1−θ) units of labor
for θ ,ϑ ∈ [0,1]. The production cost f therefore varies with the fraction of consumers that a
firm chooses to reach. The market allocates resources efficiently under CES demand when the
costs of commencing production are akin to advertising costs. The market maximizes aggregate
revenue and the quantity and productivity distortions are the same as earlier. A new insight is
gained from this richer model of fixed costs. The market does not choose the optimal levels of
advertising. When (1− ε)′ > 0, low cost firms under-advertise and reach too few consumers
(n(c) is too low). High cost firms over-advertise and their n(c) is too high. For (1−ε)′ < 0, low
the entry externality.
19Focusing on a linear demand setting with Pareto cost draws, Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto (2013) find that the
mass of firms cannot be unambiguously ranked.
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cost firms in the market over-advertise while high cost firms under-advertise.
Third, the efficiency and misallocation results are robust to introducing multiple sectors,
conditional on the resource allocation for the sector. Following Zhelobodko et al. (2012), let the
multi-sector utility function be U (q0,Q) where q0 is a homogeneous numeraire good and Q≡
Me
∫
u(q)dG is the sub-utility from differentiated goods. Conditional on a resource allocation
of (1−q0) towards differentiated goods, the bias in quantity and productivity is the same as
earlier.
The market allocation within the differentiated goods sector is efficient under CES de-
mand. This however does not imply that the market and the optimum have the same level
of (1−q0). For instance, in the Cobb-Douglass specification of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),
U (q0,Q) = q
1−γ
0 Q
γ , the optimal allocation for the homogeneous good is qopt0 = 1− γ while
the market allocation is qmkt0 = (1− γ)/(1− γ+ γε¯). The markups charged in the homoge-
neous and the differentiated goods sectors differ, leading to inefficient market allocations. The
markup for the homogeneous good is one and the marginal utility of income is fixed by the
homogeneous good. Marginal cost pricing (p = c) therefore aligns the markups across the two
sectors. Thus, Dixit and Stiglitz suggest marginal cost pricing and lumpsum entry subsidies to
induce optimal allocations across sectors. In keeping with Melitz, we consider a single sector
and find resources are optimally allocated in the market. In a single sector economy, prices are
proportional to marginal costs (p = δc) but the marginal utility of income δ is no longer fixed
by the homogeneous good. Market allocations are first best as the marginal utility of income
reflects the social cost of resources.20
For completeness, we finally note that the CES demand of Melitz is also necessary for
efficiency under the CES-Benassy class of preferences. Benassy (1996) points out that the
“taste for variety” under Dixit-Stiglitz preferences is closely linked to the degree of market
power of competitors. Taste for variety can be disentangled from market power through Benassy
preferences U(Me,cd,q)≡ ν(Me)
∫ cd
0 q(c)
ρg(c)dc which value quantity and variety differently
through ν(Me). Following Benassy (1996) and Alessandria and Choi (2007), when ν(Me) =
Mρ(νB+1)e , these preferences disentangle “taste for variety” νB from the markup to cost ratio
(1− ρ)/ρ . Market allocations under CES-Benassy are the same as CES. However, firms do
not fully internalize consumers’ taste for variety, leading to suboptimal allocations. Market
allocations are optimal only if taste for variety exactly equals the markup to cost ratio.21
As the underlying demand structure can lead to very different distortions, the remainder of
20In related work, Behrens et al. (forthcoming) examine efficiency in a multi-sector model with constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA) preferences.
21Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Feenstra and Kee (2008) derive a GDP function for this economy, and
Cole and Davies (forthcoming) highlight variety distortions by introducing existence values for variety.
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this Section discusses empirical evidence for different demand parameters.
4.5 Empirical Evidence for Demand Characteristics
The pattern of misallocation depends on demand-side elasticities. A natural question is whether
empirical work can identify which case in Table 2 is relevant. Although the elasticity of utility
is typically unobservable, the inverse demand elasticity (or firm markups) has been a subject
of research in industrial organization. A large empirical literature in industrial organization
shows a high level of markup dispersion across plants, and finds much larger markup dispersion
within industries rather than across industries (example Klette 1999; Nishimura et al. 1999).
The empirical relationship between markups and quantities is largely in line with increasing
markups though there are industries which show decreasing markups.
The empirical literature can be broadly classified into papers that use price-cost margins to
measure markups and those that use variants of the Hall methodology to estimate markups.22
In a series of influential papers, Roberts and Supina (1996, 2001) use physical output, revenue,
and input expenditures to measure price-cost margins for a number of U.S. manufactured prod-
ucts and show the majority of products exhibit increasing markups. Focusing on products with
little scope for vertical differentiation, they document a high and persistent level of price dis-
persion across plants for most products. They find markups increase with plant size and often
monotonically across quartiles of plant size for six of the thirteen products (polyester blend
fabrics, bread, coffee, oak flooring, softwood plywood, newsprint). Two products (cotton sheet-
ing, gasoline) show no significant change in markups with plant size. For the remaining four
products (hardwood plywood, vans, corrugated boxes and concrete), markups decrease signifi-
cantly with increases in plant size across the whole size distribution. One concern with the latter
finding is that decreasing markups might be driven by the decision of large plants to operate in
larger, more competitive markets, as shown by Syverson (2004) for ready-mixed concrete.
Studies based on the Hall methodology largely find a positive relationship between markups
and quantity. In a careful study using data on physical quantities, De Loecker et al. (2012) find
markups are positively correlated with firm productivity of large Indian manufacturers during
1989-2003. De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) estimate a positive correlation between markups
and productivity for Slovenian manufacturing firms during 1994-2000 and Dhyne et al. (2011)
also find markups are positively related to firm productivity for Belgian bread manufacturers
during 1995-2009. On the other hand, a highly-cited study by Klette (1999) shows Norwegian
22The Hall methodology estimates the price-cost markup as the slope coefficient from a regression of output
growth on the share-weighted rate of input growth. A discussion of this approach is provided in Tybout (2003) and
De Loecker and Goldberg (2013).
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firms with higher markups tend to have lower productivity.23
While the empirical literature largely finds increasing firm markups, social markups are
rarely observable and early papers on monopolistic competition express a lack of consensus on
how they respond to quantity. Spence (1976) suggests social markups increase with quantity
while Dixit and Stiglitz propose decreasing social markups. Vives (2001) discusses three rea-
sons for considering increasing private and social markups as the normal case (Chapter 6). First,
for symmetric consumption, this would imply that consumers have an increasing preference for
variety and a higher inverse demand elasticity at a higher output per variety. Second, aligned
preferences are theoretically appealing because the elasticity of 1− ε equals the elasticity of µ
in the limit as q approaches zero under a relatively mild assumption. Finally, commonly-used
preferences exhibit aligned preferences with increasing markups. For instance, (1− ε)′ > 0
whenever µ ′ > 0 in the HARA class (as shown in Table 1). Moreover, the generalized CES
example of Dixit and Stiglitz for decreasing markups is not continuous at zero when it is appro-
priately normalized to ensure u(0) = 0. While we cannot rule out specific cases without further
empirical investigation, the assumption of increasing private and social markups has appealing
properties for theoretical work.24
5 Efficiency and Market Size
Having discussed misallocations, this Section examines welfare and efficiency from integration
with world markets. The existence of gains from international trade is one of the “most funda-
mental results” in economics (Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2013)). Increases in market size
encourage competition, so we might expect that integration would reduce market power and
improve welfare. However, the following insight of Helpman and Krugman (1985) (pp. 179) is
relevant:
Unfortunately imperfect competition, even if takes as sanitized a form as monop-
23A separate literature provides evidence for increasing markups by estimating the price response to exchange
rate fluctuations. The typical estimate for exchange rate pass through is less than one, which suggests increasing
markups (because the pass-through rate corresponds to (1− µ)/(1− µ+ µ ′q/µ)). A discussion of this literature
is provided in Goldberg and Knetter (1997) and more recently in Klenow and Malin (2010).
24While private markups can be estimated using pricing and production data, distinguishing increasing and
decreasing social markups is more challenging as they are unlikely to be directly observable. Consequently, for
standard firm level data sets, policy inferences require more structure on demand. One approach is to use flexible
demand systems that leave determination of the four cases up to the data. For example, the VES form u(q) = aqρ+
bqγ allows all sign combinations of ε ′(q) and µ ′(q) (Online Appendix). This form overlaps with the adjustable
pass-through demand system (Bulow and Pfleiderer 1983; Weyl and Fabinger 2012). If sufficient data is available,
another approach is to recover ε(q) from price and quantity data using ε(q) = p(q)q/
∫
p(q)dq or from markup
and quantity data using lnε(q)/q =
∫ q
0 −(µ(t)/t)dt− ln
[∫ q
0 exp{
∫ s
0 −(µ(t)/t)dt}ds
]
.
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olistic competition, does not lead the economy to an optimum. As a result there
is no guarantee that expanding the economy’s opportunities, through trade or any-
thing else, necessarily leads to a gain. We cannot prove in general that countries
gain from trade in the differentiated products model.
Building on this insight, we address two related questions. First, we examine when market
expansion provides welfare gains. Having characterized distortions, we first show that welfare
gains are related to the demand-side elasticities mentioned earlier. Next, we examine efficiency
in large markets to understand the potential of market expansion in eliminating distortions. We
show large integrated markets can eliminate distortions, while preserving firm heterogeneity.
Finally, we discuss the role of firm heterogeneity and variable elasticities for quantitative work
measuring the welfare gains from international trade.
5.1 Integration, Market Size and Efficiency
We begin with the equivalence between market expansion and trade. Proposition 7 shows an
economy can increase its market size by opening to trade with foreign markets. The market
equilibrium between freely trading countries of sizes L1, ...,Ln is identical to the market equi-
librium of a single autarkic country of size L = L1 + ...+Ln, echoing Krugman (1979). This
result is summarized as Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Free trade between countries of sizes L1, ...,Ln has the same market outcome as
a unified market of size L = L1+ ...+Ln.
Proof. Online Appendix and Krugman (1979).
Proposition 7 implies that the market distortions detailed in Section 5 persist in integrated
markets. Resource allocation in an integrated market is suboptimal, except under CES demand.
When markups vary, marginal revenues do not correspond to marginal utilities so market alloca-
tions are not aligned with efficient allocations. This is particularly important when considering
trade as a policy option, as it implies that opening to trade may take the economy further from
the social optimum. For example, market expansion from trade may induce exit of low produc-
tivity firms from the market when it is optimal to keep more low productivity firms with the
purpose of preserving variety.
Helpman and Krugman (1985) provide sufficient conditions for welfare gains from trade.
They show when productivity and variety do not decline after integration, then there are gains
27
from trade.25 In terms of primitives, we find integration is always beneficial when preferences
are aligned. This is true for any cost distribution, but requires a regularity condition for decreas-
ing private markups (2+µ ′′q/µ ′(1−µ)≥ 0). We summarize this in Proposition 8.
Proposition 8. Market expansion increases welfare when preferences are aligned. (Provided
2+µ ′′q/µ ′(1−µ)≥ 0 whenever µ ′ < 0).
The economic reasoning for Proposition 8 follows from similar responses of the two demand-
side elasticities to changes in quantity. An increase in market size increases competition and
reduces per capita demand for each variety. When preferences are aligned, demand shifts alter
the private and social markups in the same direction. The market therefore incentivizes firms
towards the right allocation and provides higher welfare. Building on this result, Bykadorov
et al. (2014) show that aligned preferences are necessary and sufficient for welfare gains from
trade under symmetric firms and variable marginal costs.
The role of aligned markups in firm survival highlights how trade increases welfare. When
aligned markups increase with quantity, a rise in market size forces out the least productive
firms. Since social markups are positively correlated with quantity, the least productive firms
also contribute relatively little to welfare and their exit is beneficial. When markups decrease
with quantity, small “boutique” firms contribute at a higher rate to welfare and are also able to
survive after integration by charging higher markups. Integration enables the market to adapt
their production in line with social incentives, leading to welfare gains from trade.
While integration can increase welfare, a more ambitious question is: can we ever expect
trade to eliminate the distortions of imperfect competition? Following Stiglitz (1986), we study
market and optimal outcomes as market size becomes arbitrarily large. Since small markets
have insufficient competition, looking at large markets allows us to understand where market
expansion is headed and when international trade enables markets to eventually mitigate distor-
tions.
5.2 Efficiency in Large Markets
We examine when integrating with large global markets enables a small economy to overcome
its market distortions. From a theoretical perspective, we term a large market the limit of the
economy as the mass of workers L approaches infinity, and in practice we might expect that
sufficiently large markets approximate this limiting case.26
25Specifically, let w denote the wage and C(w,q) = w(c+ f/q) denote the average unit cost function for pro-
ducing q units of variety c. When firms are symmetric in c, trade is beneficial as long as variety does not fall
(Me ≥Maute ) and average unit cost of the autarky bundle is lower (C(w,q) ·qaut ≤C(w,qaut) ·qaut).
26How large markets need to be to justify this approximation is an open quantitative question.
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Large markets enable us to understand whether competition can eliminate distortions. For
instance, when firms are symmetric, large markets eliminate distortions as per capita fixed costs
fall to zero. This is because free entry leads to average cost pricing (p = c+ f/qL), so the per
capita fixed costs summarize market power. As market size grows arbitrarily large and per
capita fixed costs fall to zero, markups disappear leading to perfect competition and efficient
allocations in large markets.
Building on this reasoning, we develop the large market concept in two directions to under-
stand the sources of inefficiency. First, we tie the conditions for efficiency to demand primitives,
taking into account endogeneity of allocations. In the simple example above, this amounts to
determining how f/qL changes with market size under different model primitives. Second,
we examine whether productivity differences are compatible with large markets. When firms
are heterogeneous, simply knowing per capita fixed costs does not explain the distribution of
productivity, prices and quantity. At least three salient outcomes can occur. One outcome is
that competitive pressures might weed out all firms but the most productive. This occurs for
instance when marginal revenue is bounded, as when u is quadratic or CARA (e.g. Behrens and
Murata 2012). It may also happen that access to large markets allows even the least productive
firms to amortize fixed costs and produce. To retain the fundamental properties of monopolistic
competition under productivity differences, we chart out a third possibility between these two
extremes: some, but not all, firms produce. To do so, we maintain the previous regularity con-
ditions for a market equilibrium. In order to aid the analysis, we make three assumptions on
demand at small quantities. The first assumption enables a clear distinction between the three
salient outcomes in large markets.
Assumption (Interior Markups). The inverse demand elasticity and elasticity of utility are
bounded away from 0 and 1 for small quantities. Formally, lim
q→0
µ(q) and lim
q→0
ε(q) ∈ (0,1).
The assumption of interior markups guarantees that as the quantity sold from a firm to a
consumer becomes small (as happens for all positive unit cost firms), markups remain positive
(µ > 0) and prices remain bounded (µ < 1). It also guarantees that the added utility provided
per labor unit at the optimum converges to a non-zero constant (e.g., Solow 1998, Kuhn and
Vives 1999). An example of a class of utility functions satisfying interior markups is the expo-
power utility where u(q) = [1− exp(−αq1−ρ)]/α for ρ ∈ (0,1). It nests CES preferences for
α = 0.
When markups are interior, there is a sharp taxonomy of what may happen to the distribu-
tion of costs, prices and total quantities (Lq(c)), as shown in Proposition 10 in the Appendix.
In words, Proposition 10 shows that when markups are interior and the cost cutoff converges,
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one of three things must happen. 1) Only the lowest cost firms remain and prices go to zero
(akin to perfect competition), while the lowest cost firms produce infinite total quantities. 2)
Post-entry, all firms produce independent of cost while prices become unbounded and the to-
tal quantities produced become negligible, akin to a “rentier” case where firms produce little
after fixed costs are incurred. 3) The cost cutoff converges to a positive finite level, and a
non-degenerate distribution of prices and total quantities persists. Although each of these pos-
sibilities might be of interest, we focus on the case when the limiting cost draw distribution
exhibits heterogeneity ( lim
L→∞
cmktd > 0) but fixed costs still play a role in determining which firms
produce ( lim
L→∞
cmktd <∞). We therefore make the following assumption, which by Proposition 10
will guarantee non-degenerate prices and total quantities:
Assumption (Interior Convergence). In the large economy, the market and optimal allocations
have a non-degenerate cost distribution in which some but not all entrants produce.
Under interior markups and convergence, the economy converges to a monopolistically
competitive limit distinct from the extremes of a perfectly competitive limit or a rentier limit.
As the economy grows, each worker consumes a negligible quantity of each variety. At these
low levels of quantity, the inverse demand elasticity does not vanish and firms can still extract a
positive markup µ . This is in sharp contrast to a competitive limit, in which firms are left with
no market power and µ drops to zero. Similarly, the social markup (1−ε) does not drop to zero
in the monopolistically competitive limit, so each variety contributes at a positive rate to utility
even at low levels of quantity. The monopolistically competitive limit is therefore consistent
with positive markups which become more uniform with increased market size.
In fact, this monopolistically competitive limit has a sharper characterization very close to
the conditions which characterize a finite size market under CES demand (including efficiency).
We therefore refer to it as a “CES limit” and introduce one last regularity condition to obtain
this result.
Assumption (Market Identification). Quantity ratios distinguish price ratios for small q:
If κ 6= κ˜ then lim
q−→0
p(κq)/p(q) 6= lim
q−→0
p(κ˜q)/p(q).
Market identification guarantees production levels across firms can be distinguished if the
firms charge distinct prices as quantities sold become negligible. Combining these three as-
sumptions of interior markups, convergence and identification ensures the large economy goes
to the CES limit, summarized as Proposition 9. The intuition for the role of these assump-
tions follows. As market size grows large, q −→ 0 so under Interior Markups, (p− c)/p =
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µ (q)−→ µ (0) and, finite but non-zero markups can persist in the large economy. Since profits
are µ (q)/(1−µ (q)) ·Lcq, whether a particular firm survives in the large economy depends on
how variable costs Lcq evolve with market size. Clearly, if variable costs diverge to zero for a
firm with cost c, that firm must eventually exit, while if variable costs diverge to infinity, the
firm must eventually enter. To arrive at the CES limit, necessarily variable costs must converge
to a positive level, which requires convergence of the total quantity sold, Lq. However, since
firms are embedded in a heterogeneous environment where aggregate conditions impact firm
behavior, the pointwise convergence of markups {µ (q(c))} is not sufficient to guarantee that
total quantities {Lq(c)} are well behaved in aggregate. What is sufficient is that prices {p(c)}
can distinguish firms as market size grows large, thus the Market Identification condition.27
Proposition 9. Under the above assumptions, as market size approaches infinity, outcomes
approach the CES limit. This limit has the following characteristics:
1. Prices, markups and expected profits converge to positive constants.
2. Per capita quantities q(c) go to zero, while aggregate quantities Lq(c) converge.
3. Relative quantities Lq(c)/Lq(cd) converge to (c/cd)−1/α with α = limq−→0 µ(q).
4. The entrant per worker ratio Me/L converges.
5. The market and socially optimal allocations coincide.
Proposition 9 shows that integration with large markets can push economies based on vari-
able elasticity demand to the CES limit. In this limit, the inverse demand elasticity and the
elasticity of utility become constant, ensuring the market outcome is socially optimal. Firms
charge constant markups which exactly cross-subsidize entry of low productivity firms to pre-
serve variety. This wipes out the distortions of imperfect competition as the economy becomes
large. While dealing with the assumptions of the market equilibrium is somewhat delicate (see
Appendix), we can explain Proposition 9 intuitively in terms of our previous result that CES
preferences induce efficiency. In large markets, the quantity q(c) sold to any individual con-
sumer goes to zero, so markups µ(q(c)) converge to the same constant independent of c.28
This convergence to constant markups aligns perfectly with those generated by CES prefer-
ences with an exponent equal to 1− limq−→0 µ(q). Thus, large markets reduce distortions until
market allocations are perfectly aligned with socially optimal objectives.
It is somewhat remarkable that the large market outcome, which exhibits cost differences
and remains imperfectly competitive, is socially optimal. Such persistence of imperfect com-
petition is consistent with the observation of Samuelson (1967) that “the limit may be at an
27From a technical standpoint, this guarantees entry is well behaved, avoiding pathological sequences of poten-
tial equilibria as market size grows large.
28The rate at which markups converge depends on c and is in any case endogenous (see Appendix).
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irreducible positive degree of imperfection” (Khan and Sun 2002). Perloff and Salop (1985)
also note that the markup disappears if the utility from a variety is bounded, but unbounded
entry may not eliminate the markup when this condition is not met. We show that is precisely
what happens at the CES limit. While the CES limit is optimal despite imperfect competition,
it is an open empirical question whether markets are sufficiently large for this to be a reason-
able approximation to use in lieu of richer variable elasticity demand. When integrated markets
are small, variable markups are crucial in understanding distortions and additional gains can be
reaped by using domestic policy in conjunction with trade policy.
5.3 Quantitative Literature on Welfare Gains from Trade
A growing body of work seeks to quantify the gains from international trade. New quantitative
trade models typically estimate welfare gains from trade under CES demand. In an influen-
tial paper, Arkolakis et al. (2012a) show that welfare in a model with heterogeneous firms can
be summarized by two sufficient statistics: the share of expenditure on domestically produced
goods and the elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs. As these sufficient statistics are
common to heterogeneous and representative firm models, welfare gains estimated from im-
port shares and constant trade elasticities using trade data are the same across heterogeneous
and representative firm models. However, the two models only deliver the same estimates for
welfare gains when the underlying structural parameters for preferences and technology differ
across the models. We use this insight of Melitz and Redding (2013) to explain the relevance of
our optimality results for the quantitative literature on gains from trade.
Melitz and Redding find that the heterogeneous firm model of Melitz provides quantitatively
higher gains from trade than an equivalent representative firm model when the structural param-
eters are the same across these models. As they mention, this can be understood by appealing
to the social optimality results for CES demand (Proposition 1). Consider initial equilibria in
the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models that feature identical aggregate statistics and
welfare. In the homogeneous firm model, unit cost is exogenously fixed, and hence remains
unchanged when the economy opens to trade. In the heterogeneous firm model, the cost distri-
bution changes when the economy opens to trade. In a companion note (Dhingra and Morrow
2014), we show that the open economy equilibrium with trade frictions is efficient under CES
demand. Since the policymaker chooses to change the cost cutoff in an open economy, the open
economy market allocation must yield higher welfare than any other feasible allocation (where
the unit cost is unchanged). The allocation where the unit cost does not change is identical to
the open economy equilibrium in the homogeneous firm model. Therefore the open economy
equilibrium in the heterogeneous firm model must yield higher welfare than the open econ-
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omy equilibrium in the homogeneous firm model. This shows that a quantitative trade model
with the same structural parameters across models will provide higher welfare gains in a setting
with firm heterogeneity. The optimality of market allocations ensures that firm heterogeneity
increases the magnitude of welfare gains from trade.
Departing from CES preferences, market allocations are no longer optimal. This raises the
question of the role played by firm heterogeneity in altering the magnitude of welfare gains
from trade. While we do not model trade costs, Proposition 8 shows market expansion through
trade provides higher welfare gains when firms differ in productivity. Under aligned preferences
and the regularity condition (2+ µ ′′q/µ ′(1− µ) ≥ 0), we discuss when models with firm het-
erogeneity and variable elasticities provide higher welfare gains from trade than representative
firm models.
For a given change in real income, the welfare gains from trade depend on the different
assumptions on demand and firm costs. Welfare is U = Me
∫
u(q)dG = δ/ε¯ where the average
elasticity of utility is ε¯ ≡ ∫ εudG/∫ udG. An increase in market size increases real income at
the rate of the average markup (d lnδ/d lnL =
∫
µ pqdG/
∫
pqdG≡ µ˜). The change in average
elasticity can be decomposed into the change in ε(q) given u/
∫
udG, and the change in the
weights u/
∫
udG. Let xd ≡ x(q(cd)), then the change in the average elasticity of utility is
d ln ε¯
d lnL
=
∫ ε ′u
ε¯
∫
udG
d lnq
d lnL
dG+
∫ u′ε−u′ε¯
ε¯
∫
udG
d lnq
d lnL
dG+
ud
ε¯
∫
udG
(εd− ε¯)cdg(cd)d lncdd lnL︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reallocation across heterogeneous firms
.
The first term denotes the change due to a fall in quantity per firm, holding fixed the share
of each variety in the average elasticity. The second and third terms denote the change in
the average elasticity of utility due to a reallocation of resources across heterogeneous firms.
Reallocation of resources across firms changes the share of each variety in the average elasticity
of utility through
(
u(q)/
∫ cd
0 u(q)dG
)′. Using this decomposition, we can explain the role of
variable elasticities and firm heterogeneity in welfare gains from trade.
For a given change in real income (d lnδ/d lnL = µ˜), we decompose the gains from trade
into gains for a representative firm and gains due to differences in firm productivity. Defining
the market outcome of a representative firm as the revenue-weighted average of heterogeneous
firms, the gains from trade for a given change in real income are:
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d lnU
d lnL
= µ˜
∫ 1− ε
µ
εu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG︸ ︷︷ ︸
CES
+ µ˜
∫ (1− ε+µ ′q/(1−µ)
µ+µ ′q/(1−µ) −
1− ε
µ
)
εu∫
εudG
dG︸ ︷︷ ︸
VES & Representative Firm
+ µ˜
∫ ε− ε¯
µ+µ ′q/(1−µ)
εu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quantity Reallocation
+
ud∫
udG
cdg(cd)
ε¯(1−µd)(εd− ε¯)(µ˜−µd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Firm Selection
The first line contains the gains from trade for a representative firm. The first component is the
welfare gain when firm markups are constant and the second component shows how welfare
gains change when markups vary with quantity. Under CES demand, the welfare gain is the
revenue-weighted average of 1− ε . VES demand adds the second component which is positive
when markups are increasing and negative when markups are decreasing with quantity.
The second line consists of the gains from trade arising due to differences in firm productiv-
ity. The first component of the second line is the welfare gain from changes in relative quantities
across firms. When firms differ in productivity, market size affects their output levels differ-
ently and resources are reallocated across firms. For aligned preferences, quantity reallocation
increases the welfare gains from trade under the regularity condition. The second component
shows the welfare gains from firm selection. Aligned preferences ensure the market selects the
right firms as it expands and leads to higher welfare gains.
Under aligned preferences, reallocation of resources across heterogeneous firms increases
the welfare gains from trade beyond those arising in a representative firm model. As most
empirical studies are consistent with increasing markups (µ ′ > 0), structural estimates based on
CES demand therefore provide a lower bound (1− ε˜) for the potential gains from trade. For a
given change in real income, accounting for firm heterogeneity and increasing markups would
reveal higher welfare gains from trade. The magnitude of these additional gains depends on the
markup variation (through ε(q(c))−ε(q(cd)) and µ ′(q(c))) and on the productivity distribution
(through g(cd)).
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the efficiency of market allocations when firms vary in productivity and
markups. Considering the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz framework, the efficiency of CES demand is
valid even with productivity differences across firms. This is because market outcomes maxi-
mize revenue, and under CES demand, private and social incentives are perfectly aligned.
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Generalizing to variable elasticities of substitution, firms differ in market power which af-
fects the trade-off between quantity, variety and productivity. Unlike symmetric firm models,
the market distortions depend on the elasticity of demand and the elasticity of utility. Under
CES demand, these two elasticities are constant and miss out on meaningful trade-offs. When
these elasticities vary, the pattern of misallocations depends on how demand elasticities change
with quantities, so policy analysis should ascertain these elasticities and take this information
into account. While the modeling framework we consider provides a theoretical starting point
to understand distortions across firms, enriching the model with market-specific features can
yield better policy insights. Neary and Mrazova (2013) and Parenti et al. (2014) provide fur-
ther generalizations of demand and costs, and Bilbiie et al. (2006) and more recently Opp et al.
(2013) consider dynamic misallocations. Future work can also provide guidance on the design
of implementable policies to realize further welfare gains.
We focus on international integration as a key policy tool to realize potential gains. Market
expansion does not guarantee welfare gains under imperfect competition. As Dixit and Norman
(1988) put it, this may seem like a “sad note” on which to end. But we find that integration pro-
vides welfare gains when the two demand-side elasticities ensure private and social incentives
are aligned. Integrating with large markets also holds out the possibility of approaching the
CES limit, which induces constant markups and therefore an efficient outcome. Even though
integration can cause market and social objectives to perfectly align, “How Large is Large?” is
an open question. Further work might quantify these relationships and thereby exhibit the scope
of integration as a tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive markets.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 A Folk Theorem
In this context, we need to define the policy space. Provided Me and q(c), and assuming without
loss of generality that all of q(c) is consumed, allocations are determined. The only question
remaining is what class of q(c) the policymaker is allowed to choose from. A sufficiently rich
class for our purposes is q(c) which are positive and continuously differentiable on some closed
interval and zero otherwise. This follows from the basic principle that a policymaker will utilize
low cost firms before higher cost firms. Formally, we restrict q to be in sets of the form
Q[0,cd ] ≡ {q ∈ C 1,> 0 on [0,cd] and 0 otherwise}.
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We maintain Melitz’s assumptions which imply a unique market equilibrium, and use the fol-
lowing shorthand throughout the proofs: G(x)≡ ∫ x0 g(c)dc, R(x)≡ ∫ x0 cρ/(ρ−1)g(c)dc.
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume a market equilibrium exists, which guarantees that R(c) is finite
for admissible c. First note that at both the market equilibrium and the social optimum, L/Me =
fe + f G(cd) implies utility of zero so in both cases L/Me > fe + f G(cd). The policymaker’s
problem is
max MeL
∫ cd
0
q(c)ρg(c)dc subject to fe+ f G(cd)+L
∫ cd
0
cq(c)g(c)dc = L/Me
where the maximum is taken over choices of Me, cd, q ∈ Q[0,cd ]. We will exhibit a globally
optimal q∗(c) for each fixed (Me,cd) pair, reducing the policymaker’s problem to a choice of
Me and cd . We then solve for Me as a function of cd and finally solve for cd .
Finding q∗(c) for Me,cd fixed. For convenience, define the functionals V (q),H(q) by
V (q)≡ L
∫ cd
0
v(c,q(c))dc, H(q)≡ L
∫ cd
0
h(c,q(c))dc
where h(c,x)≡ xcg(c) and v(c,x)≡ xρg(c). One may show that V (q)−λH(q) is strictly con-
cave ∀λ .29 Now for fixed (Me,cd), consider the problem of finding q∗ given by
max
q∈Q[0,cd ]
V (q) subject to H(q) = L/Me− fe− f G(cd). (3)
Following Troutman (1996), if some q∗ maximizes V (q)− λH(q) on Q[0,cd ] for some λ and
satisfies the constraint then it is a solution to Equation (3). For any λ , a sufficient condition for
some q∗ to be a global maximum onQ[0,cd ] is
D2v(c,q∗(c)) = λD2h(c,q∗(c)). (4)
This follows because (4) implies for any such q∗, ∀ξ s.t. q∗+ξ ∈Q[0,cd ] we have δV (q∗;ξ ) =
λδH(q∗;ξ ) (where δ denotes the Gateaux derivative in the direction of ξ ) and q∗ is a global
max since V (q)−λH(q) is strictly concave. Condition (4) is ρq∗(c)ρ−1g(c) = λcg(c) which
implies q∗(c) = (λc/ρ)1/(ρ−1).30 From above, this q∗ serves as a solution to maxV (q) provided
that H(q∗) = L/Me− fe− f G(cd). This will be satisfied by an appropriate λ since for fixed λ
29Since h is linear in x, H is linear and since v is strictly concave in x (using ρ < 1) so is V .
30By abuse of notation we allow q∗ to be ∞ at c= 0 since reformulation of the problem omitting this single point
makes no difference to allocations or utility which are all eventually integrated.
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we have
H(q∗) = L
∫ cd
0
(λc/ρ)1/(ρ−1)cg(c)dc = L(λ/ρ)1/(ρ−1)R(cd)
so choosing λ as λ ∗ ≡ ρ (L/Me− fe− f G(cd))ρ−1 /Lρ−1R(cd)ρ−1 makes q∗ a solution. In
summary, for each (Me,cd) a globally optimal q∗ satisfying the resource constraint is
q∗(c) = c1/(ρ−1) (L/Me− fe− f G(cd))/LR(cd) (5)
which must be > 0 since L/Me− fe− f G(cd) must be > 0 as discussed at the beginning.
Finding Me for cd fixed. We may therefore consider maximizing W (Me,cd) where
W (Me,cd)≡MeL
∫ cd
0
q∗(c)ρg(c)dc = MeL1−ρ [L/Me− fe− f G(cd)]ρR(cd)1−ρ . (6)
Direct investigation yields a unique solution to the FOC of M∗e (cd) = (1−ρ)L/( fe + f G(cd))
and d2W/d2Me < 0 so this solution maximizes W .
Finding cd . Finally, we have maximal welfare for each fixed cd from Equation (6), explicitly
W˜ (cd) ≡W (M∗e (cd),cd). We may rule out cd = 0 as an optimum since this yields zero utility.
Solving this expression and taking logs shows that
lnW˜ (cd) = lnρρ(1−ρ)1−ρL2−ρ +(1−ρ) [lnR(cd)− ln( fe+ f G(cd))] .
Defining B(cd) ≡ lnR(cd)− ln( fe+ f G(cd)) we see that to maximize lnW˜ (cd) we need max-
imize only B(cd). In order to evaluate critical points of B, note that differentiating B and rear-
ranging using R′(cd) = c
ρ/(ρ−1)
d g(cd) yields
B′(cd) =
{
cρ/(ρ−1)d −R(cd) f/ [ fe+ f G(cd)]
}
/g(cd)R(cd). (7)
Since limcd−→0 c
ρ/(ρ−1)
d = ∞ and limcd−→∞ c
ρ/(ρ−1)
d = 0 while R(cd) and G(cd) are bounded,
there is a positive interval [a,b] outside of which B′(x) > 0 for x ≤ a and B′(x) < 0 for x ≥
b. Clearly supx∈(0,a]B(x),supx∈[b,∞)B(x) < supx∈[a,b]B(x) and therefore any global maximum
of B occurs in (a,b). Since B is continuously differentiable, a maximum exists in [a,b] and
all maxima occur at critical points of B. From Equation (7), B′(cd) = 0 iff R(cd)/c
ρ/(ρ−1)
d −
G(cd) = fe/ f . For cd that satisfy B′(cd) = 0, M∗e and q∗ are determined and inspection shows
the entire system corresponds to the market allocation. Therefore B has a unique critical point,
which is a global maximum that maximizes welfare.
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A.2 VES Market Allocation
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a policymaker who faces a utility function v(q) ≡ u′ (q)q.
Provided v(q) satisfies the regularity conditions used in the proof of optimality, it follows that
the conditions below characterize the unique constrained maximum of LMe
∫ cd
0 u
′ (q(c))q(c)dG,
where δ denotes the Lagrange multiplier:
u′′ (q(c))q(c)+u′ (q(c)) = δc,
u′ (q(cd))q(cd)/(cdq(cd)+ f/L) = δ ,∫ cd
0
u′ (q(c))q(c)dG/
(∫ cd
0
[cq(c)+ f/L]dG+ fe/L
)
= δ ,
Me
(∫ cd
0
Lcq(c)+ f dG+ fe
)
= L.
Comparing these conditions, we see that if δ is the same as under the market allocation, the
first three equations respectively determine each firm’s optimal quantity choice, the ex post
cost cutoff, and the zero profit condition while the fourth is the resource constraint and must
hold under the market allocation. Therefore if this system has a unique solution, the market
allocation maximizes LMe
∫ cd
0 u
′ (q(c))q(c)dG. Since these conditions completely characterize
every market equilibrium, the assumed uniqueness of the market equilibrium guarantees such a
unique solution.
A.3 Static Distortion Results
Proof of Proposition 5. The result relies on the following relationship we first prove:
σ ≡ sup
c≤cmktd
ε
(
qmkt(c)
)
> δ/λ> inf
c≤coptd
ε
(
qopt(c)
)≡ σ . (8)
To see this recall δ = Mmkte
∫ cmktd
0 u
′ (qmkt(c))qmkt(c)dG so σ > δ/λ because
δ/σ = Mmkte
∫ cmktd
0
(
ε
(
qmkt(c)
)
/σ
)
u
(
qmkt(c)
)
dG < Mmkte
∫ cmktd
0
u
(
qmkt(c)
)
dG (9)
and λ is the maximum welfare per capita so λ > Mmkte
∫ cmktd
0 u
(
qmkt(c)
)
dG > δ/σ . A similar
argument shows λσ < δ , giving Equation (8). Now note that[
u′′
(
qmkt(c)
)
qmkt(c)+u′
(
qmkt(c)
)]
/δ = c, u′
(
qopt(c)
)
/λ = c. (10)
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And it follows from Equations (10) we have[
1−µ
(
qmkt(c)
)]
·u′
(
qmkt(c)
)
/u′
(
qopt(c)
)
= δ/λ . (11)
Suppose µ ′ > 0 > (1− ε)′, and it is sufficient to show inf
c≤cmktd
1− µ (qmkt(c)) ≥ σ , since then
Equations (8) and (11) show that u′
(
qmkt(c)
)
< u′ (qopt(c)) which implies qmkt(c) > qopt(c).
Since µ ′ > 0 > (1− ε)′ and by assumption lim
c→0
qmkt(c) = ∞= lim
c→0
qopt(c),
inf
c≤cmktd
1−µ
(
qmkt(c)
)
= lim
q→∞1−µ (q) = limq→∞ε (q)+ ε
′ (q)q/ε (q)≥ lim
q→∞ε (q) = σ .
Similarly, if µ ′ < 0 < (1− ε)′ one may show that sup
c≤cmktd
1− µ (qmkt(c)) ≤ σ , implying from
Equations (8) and (11) that qmkt(c)< qopt(c).
Now consider the cases when µ ′ and ε ′ have different signs, and since infq ε (q) > 0,
from above in both cases it holds that infq>0 1− µ (q) = infq>0 ε (q) and supq>0 1− µ (q) =
supq>0 ε (q). The arguments above have shown that supq>0ε (q)> δ/λ > infq>0 ε (q) and there-
fore
supq>01−µ (q)> δ/λ > infq>01−µ (q) .
It follows from Equation (11) that for some c∗, 1−µ (qmkt(c∗))= δ/λ and therefore u′ (qmkt(c∗))=
u′ (qopt(c∗)) so qmkt(c∗) = qopt(c∗). Furthermore, qmkt(c) is strictly decreasing in c so with
µ ′ 6= 0, c∗ is unique. Returning to Equation (11), using the fact that qmkt(c) is strictly decreas-
ing in c also shows the relative magnitudes of qmkt(c) and qopt(c) for c 6= c∗.
Proof of Proposition 6. For α ∈ [0,1], define vα(q)≡ αu′ (q)q+(1−α)u(q) and also define
w(q) ≡ u′ (q)q− u(q) so vα (q) = u(q) +αw(q). Consider the continuum of maximization
problems (indexed by α) defined as:
max
Me,cd ,q(c)
LMe
∫ cd
0
vα (q(c))dG subject to L≥Me
(∫ cd
0
Lcq(c)+ f dG+ fe
)
. (12)
Let the Lagrange multiplier associated with each α in Equation (12) be written as β (α). By ap-
pealing to the envelope theorem and differentiating (12) in Me we have β (α)=Me
∫ cd
0 vα (q(c))dG
and that dβ/dα = Me
∫ cd
0 w(q(c))dG = Me
∫ cd
0 u(q(c)) [ε(q)−1]dG < 0. The conditions char-
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acterizing the solution to every optimum also imply
β (α) = vα (q(cd))/(cdq(cd)+ f/L) ,
whereby we arrive at
dvα (q(cd))/dα = (dβ/dα)(vα (q(cd))/β )+β ((dcd/dα)q(cd)+ cd (dq(cd)/dα))
= w(q(cd))+ v′α (q(cd))(dq(cd)/dα)
= w(q(cd))+βcd (dq(cd)/dα)
so cancellation and rearrangement, using the expressions for β , dβ/dα above shows
βq(cd)(dcd/dα) = w(q(cd))− (vα (q(cd))/β )(dβ/dα)
= w(q(cd))−
(
vα (q(cd))/Me
∫ cd
0
vα (q(c))dG
)
·Me
∫ cd
0
w(q(c))dG.
We conclude that dcd/dα ≷ 0 when w(q(cd))
∫ cd
0 vα (q(c))dG ≷ vα (q(cd))
∫ cd
0 w(q(c))dG.
Expanding this inequality we have (suppressing q(c) terms in integrands):
w(q(cd))
∫ cd
0
udG+αw(q(cd))
∫ cd
0
wdG≷ u(q(cd))
∫ cd
0
wdG+αw(q(cd))
∫ cd
0
wdG.
Cancellation and expansion again show this is equivalent to
u′ (q(cd))q(cd)
∫ cd
0
udG≷ u(q(cd))
∫ cd
0
u′q(c)dG.
Finally, this expression can be rewritten ε (q(cd))≷
∫ cd
0 ε (q(c))u(q(c))dG/
∫ cd
0 u(q(c))dG and
since q(c) is strictly decreasing in c, we see dcd/dα ≷ 0 when ε ′ ≶ 0. Note that Equation (12)
shows α = 0 corresponds to the social optimum while α = 1 corresponds to the market equi-
librium. It follows that when ε ′ < 0 that dcd/dα > 0 so we have cmktd > c
opt
d and vice versa for
ε ′ > 0.
A.4 Welfare Gains from Trade
The sufficient condition for gains from trade follows from differentiating U = Me
∫
u(q)dG =
δ/ε¯ where the average elasticity of utility is ε¯ ≡ ∫ εudG/∫ udG. An increase in market size
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raises the marginal utility of income at the rate of average markups d lnδ/d lnL=
∫
µ pqdG/
∫
pqdG≡
µ˜ . From d lnδ/d lnL and d ln ε¯/d lnL, the change in welfare is
d lnU
d lnL
= µ˜
[
1+
∫ 1−µ− ε¯
µ+µ ′q/(1−µ)
εu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG
]
+
[
ud∫
udG
cdg(cd)
ε¯(1−µd)(εd− ε¯)(µ˜−µd)
]
.
When preferences are aligned, the second term in square brackets is positive because µ and
(1− ε) move in the same direction. Change in the cost cutoff therefore has a positive effect
on welfare, irrespective of the cost distribution G(c). The first term in square brackets is also
positive when preferences are aligned, given the regularity condition (2+µ ′′q/µ ′(1−µ)≥ 0).
Proof of Proposition 8. Following the discussion above, it is sufficient to show that for γ (c)≡
ε (µ+µ ′q/(1−µ))−1,
1+
∫ 1−µ− ε¯
µ+µ ′q/(1−µ)
εu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG =
∫ [
1− ε¯+µ ′q/(1−µ)] γu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG≥ 0. (13)
This clearly holds for µ ′ ≥ 0, and for the other case where preferences are aligned, we have
µ ′ < 0 < ε ′. Expanding Equation (13) for γ¯ ≡ ∫ γ · (u/∫ udG)dG shows that∫ [
1− ε¯+µ ′q/(1−µ)] γu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG =[1− ε¯−µ] γ¯/ε¯+1+
∫
[µ−µ] γu
ε¯
∫
udG
dG.
Since ε ′ > 0, 1− ε−µ > 0 and [1− ε¯−µ] γ¯/ε¯+1 > 0. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that∫
[µ−µ] γuε¯ ∫ udGdG > 0. This sufficient condition is equivalent to∫
µ
u∫
udG
dG≥
∫
µ
γu
γ¯
∫
udG
dG (14)
Since
∫
γ(c) · (u/γ¯ ∫ udG)dG = 1 and dµ/dc > 0, it follows that if dγ/dc < 0, then Equation
(14) holds by stochastic dominance. As dγ/dc< 0 iff dγ/dq> 0, we examine the sign of dγ/dq
below.
sign{dγ/dq}= sign
{
d lnε
(
µ+µ ′q/(1−µ))−1 /d lnq}
= sign
{−(2+µ ′′q/µ ′ (1−µ))µ ′q+ (ε ′q/ε−µ ′q/(1−µ))(µ+µ ′q/(1−µ))} .
The additional hypothesis that 2+ µ ′′q/µ ′(1− µ) ≥ 0 guarantees each term above is positive,
so dγ/dq > 0 and we conclude Equation (14) holds, giving the result.
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A.5 Results Regarding the Impact of Large Markets
To arrive at the large market result, we first state Lemmas characterizing convergence in the
large market and then show market allocations coincide with optimal allocations. Detailed
proofs of the Lemmas are in the Online Appendix.
Lemma. As market size becomes large:
1. Market revenue is increasing in market size and goes to infinity.
2. At the optimum, utility per capita is increasing in market size and goes to infinity.
3. Market entry goes to infinity.
Proof. Online Appendix.
Lemma. For all market sizes and all positive marginal cost (c > 0) firms:
1. Profits (pi(c)) and social profits (ϖ(c)≡ (1− ε(c))/ε(c) · cq(c)L− f ) are bounded.
2. Total quantities (Lq(c)) in the market and optimal allocation are bounded.
Proof. Online Appendix.
Proposition 10. Assume markups are interior. Then under the market allocation:
1. lim
L→∞
cmktd = ∞ iff limL→∞
p
(
cmktd
)
= ∞ iff lim
L→∞
Lq
(
cmktd
)
= 0.
2. lim
L→∞
cmktd = 0 iff limL→∞
p
(
cmktd
)
= 0 iff lim
L→∞
Lq
(
cmktd
)
= ∞.
3. lim
L→∞
cmktd ∈ (0,∞) iff limL→∞p
(
cmktd
) ∈ (0,∞) iff lim
L→∞
Lq
(
cmktd
) ∈ (0,∞).
Similarly, under the optimal allocation:
1. lim
L→∞
coptd = ∞ iff limL→∞
u◦q
(
coptd
)
/λq
(
coptd
)
= ∞ iff lim
L→∞
Lq
(
coptd
)
= 0.
2. lim
L→∞
coptd = 0 iff limL→∞
u◦q
(
coptd
)
/λq
(
coptd
)
= 0 iff lim
L→∞
Lq
(
coptd
)
= ∞.
3. lim
L→∞
coptd ∈ (0,∞) iff limL→∞u◦q
(
coptd
)
/λq
(
coptd
)
∈ (0,∞) iff lim
L→∞
Lq
(
coptd
)
∈ (0,∞).
Proof. Note the following zero profit relationships that hold at the cost cutoff ca, suppressing
the market superscripts throughout we have:
u′ (q(cd))/δ − f/ [Lq(cd) ·µ ◦q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd))] = cd, (15)
Lcdq(cd) ·µ ◦q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd)) = f . (16)
First, if lim
L→∞
Lq(cd) = 0, Equation (16) implies cd · µ ◦ q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd)) −→ ∞. Clearly
q(cd) −→ 0 and since lim
q→0
µ (q) ∈ (0,1), µ ◦ q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd)) is bounded, and therefore
cd −→ ∞. Now suppose cd −→ ∞ and since cd ≤ u′ (q(cd))/δ , u′ (q(cd))/δ −→ ∞. Finally, if
u′ (q(cd))/δ −→∞, since δ −→∞, necessarily q(cd)−→ 0 so we find µ ◦q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd))
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is bounded. It follows from Equation (16) that Lcdq(cd) is bounded, so from Equation (15),
Lq(cd) ·u′ (q(cd))/δ is bounded so Lq(cd)−→ 0.
If lim
L→∞
Lq(cd) = ∞, q(cd) −→ 0 so from lim
q→0
µ (q) ∈ (0,1), µ ◦ q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd)) is
bounded. Therefore from Equation (16), cd −→ 0. Now assume cd −→ 0 so from (16), Lq(cd) ·
µ ◦ q(cd)/(1−µ ◦q(cd)) −→ ∞ which implies with Equation (15) that u′ (q(cd))/δ −→ 0.
Finally, if u′ (q(cd))/δ −→ 0, (15) shows cd −→ 0.
The second set of equivalences follows from examining the conditions for a firm at the
limiting cost cutoff c∞d ∈ (0,∞). The argument for the optimal allocation is similar.
Lemma. Assume interior convergence. Then as market size grows large:
1. In the market, p(c) converges in (0,∞) for c > 0 and Lq(cd) converges in (0,∞).
2. In the optimum, u◦q(c)/λq(c) and Lq(cd) converge in (0,∞) for c > 0.
Proof. Online Appendix.
Lemma. Assume interior convergence and large market identification. Then for the market and
social optimum, Lq(c) converges for c > 0.
Proof. Online Appendix.
Lemma. At extreme quantities, social and private markups align as follows:
1. If lim
q→0
1− ε(q)< 1 then lim
q→0
1− ε(q) = lim
q→0
µ(q).
2. If lim
q→∞1− ε(q)< 1 then limq→∞1− ε(q) = limq→∞µ(q).
Proof. Online Appendix.
Lemma. Assume interior convergence and large market identification. As market size grows
large:
1. q(c)/q(cd)−→ (c/cd)−1/α with α = lim
q→0
µ (q).
2. The cost cutoffs for the social optimum and market converge to the same value.
3. The entrant per worker ratios Me/L converge to the same value.
Proof. Define ϒ(c/cd) by (the above results show this limit is well defined)
ϒ(c/cd)≡ lim
q→0
u′(ϒ(c/cd)q)/u′(q) = c/cd.
We will show in fact that ϒ(c/cd) = (c/cd)−α . It follows from the definition that ϒ is weakly
decreasing, and the results above show ϒ is one to one, so it is strictly decreasing. Define
fq(z)≡ u′(zq)/u′(q) so lim
q→0
fq(z) = ϒ−1(z) for all ϒ−1(z) ∈ (0,1). Note
f ′q(z) = u
′′(zq)q/u′(q) =−µ(zq) ·u′(zq)/zu′(q)
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so since lim
q→0
µ(zq) = µ∞ ∈ (0,1) and lim
q→0
u′(zq)/zu′(q) = ϒ−1(z)/z, we know that lim
q→0
f ′q(z) =
−µ∞ϒ−1(z)/z. On any strictly positive closed interval I, µ and u′(zq)/zu′(q) are monotone in z
so f ′q(z) converges uniformly on I as q−→ 0. Rudin (1964) (Thm 7.17) shows
lim
q−→0
f ′q(z) = d limq−→0
f q(z)/dz =−µ∞ϒ−1(z)/z = dϒ−1(z)/dz. (17)
We conclude that ϒ−1(z) is differentiable and thus continuous. Given the form deduced in
(17), ϒ−1(z) is continuously differentiable. Since dϒ−1(z)/dz= 1/ϒ′ ◦ϒ−1(z), composing both
sides with ϒ(z) and using (17) we have ϒ′(z) = −ϒ(z)/µ∞z. Therefore ϒ is CES, in particular
ϒ(z) = z−1/µ∞ .
Finally, let copt∞ and cmkt∞ be the limiting cost cutoffs as L−→∞ for at the social optimum and
market, respectively. Letting qopt(c), qmkt(c) denote the socially optimal and market quantities,
we know from above that for all c > 0:
qopt (c)/qopt
(
coptd
)
−→ (copt∞ /c)1/α , qmkt (c)/qmkt(cmktd )−→ (cmkt∞ /c)1/α . (18)
Now consider the conditions involving fe,
∫ cmktd
0 pi(c)dG = fe =
∫ coptd
0 ϖ(c)dG. Expanding,
L
∫ cmktd
0
µ ◦qmkt(c)
1−µ ◦qmkt(c)cq
mkt(c)dG− f G(cmktd ) = L
∫ coptd
0
1− ε ◦qopt(c)
ε ◦qopt(c) cq
opt(c)dG− f G(coptd ).
It necessarily follows that
lim
L−→∞
L
∫ cmktd
0
µ ◦qmkt(c)/
(
1−µ ◦qmkt(c)
)
· cqmkt(c)dG− f G(cmktd ) =
lim
L−→∞
L
∫ coptd
0
(
1− ε ◦qopt(c))/ε ◦qopt(c) · cqopt(c)dG− f G(coptd ). (19)
Using Equation (18), we see that Lqopt(c) and Lqmkt(c) converge uniformly on any strictly
positive closed interval. Combined with the fact that lim
q→0
µ(q) = lim
q→0
1− ε(q), we see from
Equation (19) the limits of the µ/(1−µ) and (1− ε)/ε terms are equal and factor out of
Equation (19), leaving
lim
L−→∞
Lcmkt∞ q
mkt(cmkt∞ )
∫ cmktd
0
(c/cmkt∞ )(c/c
mkt
d )
−1/αdG− f G(cmktd ) =
lim
L−→∞
Lcopt∞ q
opt(copt∞ )
∫ coptd
0
(c/copt∞ )(c/c
opt
d )
−1/αdG− f G(coptd ).
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Noting f (1−µ∞)/µ∞ = Lcmkt∞ qmkt(cmkt∞ ) = Lcopt∞ qopt(copt∞ ), we therefore have
lim
L−→∞
∫ cmktd
0
(c/cmkt∞ )
1−1/α(cmkt∞ /c
mkt
d )
−1/αdG−G(cmktd ) =
lim
L−→∞
∫ coptd
0
(c/copt∞ )
1−1/α(copt∞ /c
opt
d )
−1/αdG−G(coptd )
so that finally evaluating the limits, we have
∫ cmkt∞
0
[
(c/cmkt∞ )
1−1/α −1
]
dG =
∫ copt∞
0
[
(c/copt∞ )
1−1/α −1
]
dG. (20)
Letting h(w) ≡ ∫ w0 [(c/w)1−1/α −1]dG, we see that h′(w) = ∫ w0 (1/α−1)c1−1/αw1/α−2dG
and since α = µ∞ ∈ (0,1), h′ > 0. Since h is strictly increasing, there is a unique copt∞ , namely
copt∞ = cmkt∞ such that Equation (20) holds. Checking the conditions for L/Me show they coincide
between the market and social optimum as well.
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